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AMATEUR HOUR IS OVER: TIME FOR COLLEGE 
ATHLETES TO CLOCK IN UNDER THE FLSA 
Nicholas C. Daly 
ABSTRACT 
The debate surrounding the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (NCAA) amateurism principles has waged for decades. 
The governing body of college athletics insists that the athletes who 
compete on a daily basis should not—or shall not—receive any 
compensation in exchange for their services while NCAA executives 
line their pockets with billions of dollars each year. This concept of 
“no pay for play” has drawn national criticism since the NCAA 
created the term “student-athlete” in the 1950s to combat a workers’ 
compensation claim. The amateurism principles were concocted as 
an attempt to prevent college athletes from being classified as 
employees of their universities; put more plainly, the NCAA 
intentionally labeled college athletes as “amateurs” to deny the 
athletes the compensation they are entitled to.  
 
 Editor in Chief, Georgia State University Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2021, Georgia State University 
College of Law. Thank you to Professors Jack Williams, Moraima Ivory, and Kelly Timmons for your 
guidance, commentary, and feedback throughout the process of drafting this Note. Thank you to my 
colleagues and classmates from the Georgia State University Law Review for your time, attentiveness, 
and dedication to reviewing and editing this Note to prepare it for publication and thank you for your 
friendship throughout law school. Thank you to the judges and clerks whom I have had the great fortune 
of working with and learning from while in law school; your guidance and mentorship have helped me 
grow as a writer, as a student, and as a person. Thank you to my friends and family outside of law 
school for indulging me in conversations about this Note and law school more generally; your support 
and encouragement throughout this journey have meant more to me than you could understand. Finally, 
and most importantly, thank you to Claude Felton and all of those in the University of Georgia Sports 
Communications Department for giving me the opportunity of a lifetime—one that allowed me to 
develop my love of sports and my passion for college athletes’ rights. Though the arguments and 
opinions expressed in this Note may not be shared by all of those in the office, thank you all for your 
kindness, support, and mentorship during my time in Athens, Georgia, and beyond. Thank you for 
making me feel like part of your family. 
1
Daly: Amateur Hour Is Over
Published by Reading Room, 2021
472 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
Athletes have challenged the NCAA’s amateurism principles under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the past, petitioning courts 
to recognize athletes as “employees” of their universities, but to no 
avail. Courts traditionally rely on an “economic reality” test to 
determine whether an employer–employee relationship exists, 
entitling the petitioning party to guaranteed protections under 
federal labor laws. In the context of college athletics, however, the 
economic reality of the relationship between the athletes, their 
universities, and the NCAA is traditionally defined by the NCAA’s 
concept of amateurism. But what happens when amateurism is 
exposed for the sham of a concept it truly is? 
This Note explores how recent judicial, legislative, and societal 
events have eviscerated the credibility of the NCAA’s amateurism 
principles. Specifically, this Note argues that a district court order, 
though issued in the antitrust context, precludes future courts from 
relying on the amateurism principles to define the economic reality of 
college athletics. The case, In re National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation (Alston), exposes the 
hypocrisy behind the NCAA’s compensation rules in a way that 
changes the calculus of an FLSA challenge and demands a finding 
that college athletes qualify as employees under federal labor laws. 
Now, the Supreme Court is set to get involved, granting certiorari to 
review Alston and allow the Court to assess the amateurism 
principles for the first time in thirty-five years. With the pressure 
surrounding the NCAA’s exploitation of college athletes reaching an 
all-time high, this Note proposes that the NCAA proactively abandon 
its commitment to its antiquated concept of amateurism and afford 
college athletes the basic fundamental rights they are entitled to 
through collective bargaining and group licensing agreements. 
The NCAA has stubbornly insisted on labeling college athletes as 
“amateurs” when reality reflects that the athletes are anything but. 
In fact, the only distinguishing factor that separates college athletes 
from their professional counterparts is the arbitrary—and frankly 
insulting—label that the NCAA desperately clings to. No longer can 
the charade continue. The NCAA’s time is up; amateur hour is over. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Picture this: a billion-dollar industry growing at a rate faster than 
Fortune 500 corporations that prohibits the very individuals 
responsible for generating such revenue from earning their fair 
share.1 Something seems inherently wrong with this scenario, but this 
is the reality of college athletics.2 The National Collegiate Athletic 
 
 1. SENATOR CHRIS MURPHY, MADNESS, INC.: HOW EVERYONE IS GETTING RICH OFF COLLEGE 
SPORTS—EXCEPT THE PLAYERS 2 (2019); NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019–20 NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.1.2 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]; Jay D. Lonick, Note, 
Bargaining with the Real Boss: How the Joint-Employer Doctrine Can Expand Student-Athlete 
Unionization to the NCAA As an Employer, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 138 (2015). The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Division I Bylaws directly prohibit college athletes from 
receiving “any direct or indirect salary, gratuity or comparable compensation” in return for their 
athletics services, unless such compensation qualifies as an educational expense. NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL, supra, at arts. 12.1.2.1, 15.01.1. 
 2. See generally NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 12.1.2.1; Brian Murphy, NCAA 
Must Allow Players to Profit from Name and Image, NC Republican’s New Bill Says, THE NEWS & 
OBSERVER [hereinafter Murphy, NC NIL Bill], 
https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/article227181209.html (Mar. 7, 2019, 2:45 PM) (“[T]he current 
set-up is denying athletes—99.4 percent of whom . . . won’t collect a paycheck from a professional 
sports organization—a chance to monetize their talents.”). Following the lead of many journalists in the 
past, and more recently the editors of The Daily Tar Heel, the University of North Carolina’s student 
newspaper, this Note uses the term “college athlete” rather than “student-athlete” to describe those 
engaging in college athletics. John Feinstein, The NCAA Uses ‘Student-Athlete’ As a Weapon. Some 
College Journalists Just Stripped It Away., WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2020, 10:46 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/08/19/daily-tar-heel-student-athletes-unc/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z38A-T3ZC]. The term “student-athlete” is really a derogatory label that the NCAA 
concocted to bolster the illusion that college athletes are students first and not workers who deserve their 
fair share of the millions of dollars they generate for their universities and the NCAA. Id. (“[T]he term 
‘student-athlete’ has been used for years by college administrators, coaches and (sadly) some in the 
media as a barrier to the notion that college athletes should be compensated for the work they do—and 
for the millions of dollars they help generate for their schools.”). As the Daily Tar Heel editors 
eloquently wrote, “[t]o accept the term ‘student athlete’ is to accept the NCAA and the nation’s college 
athletic departments’ agenda that these athletes are not employees and to silence the voices of these 
athletes.” The Daily Tar Heel Staff, The Daily Tar Heel Will No Longer Use the Term ‘Student Athlete,’ 
DAILY TAR HEEL (Aug. 9, 2020, 8:17 PM), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2020/08/student-
athlete-term-editorial [https://perma.cc/D3PA-D59A]. National outlets, such as Sports Illustrated, have 
since followed suit. Feinstein, supra; see also Julie Kliegman (@jmkliegman), TWITTER (Aug. 11, 2020, 
10:54 AM), https://twitter.com/jmkliegman/status/1293199236021080064?s=20. As the antiquated 
concept of amateurism topples, so too must the stilts that have propped up its hypocritical principles for 
so long. See Feinstein, supra (“The term ‘student-athletes’ has been a naked hypocrisy for years, used 
by the media and others to promote absurd myths dreamed up by the emperors of college athletics.”). 
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Association (NCAA) justifies the prohibition on compensating 
college athletes by hiding behind the facade of “amateurism.”3 The 
NCAA vehemently insists that amateurism is a bedrock principle of 
the organization’s existence yet fails to actually define the term in its 
Division I Bylaws.4 Traditionally, amateurism is understood to stand 
for the proposition that college athletes must not receive 
compensation in exchange for their participation in intercollegiate 
athletics.5 But this concept of amateurism ignores the ever-changing 
makeup of the market surrounding college athletics.6 Fortunately for 
the athletes, recent developments in the judiciary, legislature, and 
even the NCAA’s internal Board of Governors signal that times are 
indeed changing.7 
 
 3. Christine Colwell, Comment, Playing for Pay or Playing to Play: Student-Athletes As Employees 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 79 LA. L. REV. 899, 913 (2019) (stating that amateurism ensures 
“that student-athletes focus on attaining a quality education and preserving the idea that student-athletes 
do not play for pay”). 
 4. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston I), 
375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[The NCAA] offer[s] no stand-alone definition of 
amateurism . . . in the NCAA rules.”), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020). See generally NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 2.9. 
 5. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d. at 1071 (“[The NCAA] and their witnesses often describe amateurism 
by reference to what they say it is not: namely, amateurism is not ‘pay for play.’”). See generally NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 12. 
 6. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 12 (“The NCAA and collegiate sports more broadly no longer 
primarily benefit the players. The current system does more to advance the financial interests of 
broadcasters, apparel companies, and athletic departments than it does for the student-athletes who 
provide the product from which everyone else profits.”). 
 7. See generally Pamela A. Maclean & Eben Novy-Williams, NCAA Loses Critical U.S. Court 
Ruling on Athlete Compensation, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-
09/ncaa-loses-critical-u-s-court-ruling-on-pay-for-play [https://perma.cc/8RYF-SBAM] (Mar. 8, 2019, 
11:09 PM) (discussing the most recent landmark judicial ruling in Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, that 
the NCAA’s compensation rules violate federal antitrust laws); Michael McCann, What’s Next After 
California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to Play Act into Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019) 
[hereinafter McCann, California Game Changer], https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/30/fair-pay-to-
play-act-law-ncaa-california-pac-12 [https://perma.cc/75W3-BU9F] (discussing state legislation creating 
a statutory right for college athletes to profit from the commercial use of their names, images, and 
likenesses (NILs) and noting that college sports fans should “buckle up” because “times may be 
changing”); Dan Murphy, NCAA, Congress Have Labyrinth of Options, but NIL clock Is Ticking, ESPN 
(Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Murphy, Congressional NIL Options], https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/30534578/ncaa-congress-labyrinth-options-nil-clock-ticking [https://perma.cc/77RR-
HJTG] (discussing multiple forms of proposed federal legislation that would allow college athletes to 
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In September of 2019, California became the first state in the 
country to create a legal right for college athletes to earn 
compensation for the commercial use of their name, image, and 
likeness (NIL).8 The “Fair Pay to Play Act” stoked an already intense 
debate surrounding the NCAA’s compensation regulations and 
ignited a trend of legislators across the country proposing similar 
legislation in their respective states.9 Florida and Colorado notably 
passed similar legislation in the summer of 2020.10 While the 
 
earn compensation for the commercial use of their NILs in various ways, subject to varying restrictions); 
Steve Berkowitz & Dan Wolken, NCAA Board of Governors Opens Door to Athletes Benefiting from 
Name, Image and Likeness, USA TODAY: COLLEGE, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2019/10/29/ncaa-board-opens-door-athletes-use-name-
image-and-likeness/2492383001/ [https://perma.cc/LZM7-AZ9Y] (Oct. 29, 2019, 9:26 PM) (discussing 
the NCAA Board of Governors’ unanimous vote to allow college athletes to benefit from the 
commercial use of their NILs); Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules Changes Related to 
Athletes’ Name, Image and Likeness, USA TODAY: COLLEGE [hereinafter Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils 
Proposed Rules Changes], https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/11/13/ncaa-nil-name-
image-likeness-proposal/6281507002/ [https://perma.cc/JNC2-EYFR] (Nov. 13, 2020, 2:15 PM) 
(discussing the NCAA’s proposed rules changes that would allow college athletes to benefit from the 
commercial use of their NILs). 
 8. McCann, California Game Changer, supra note 7. The Fair Pay to Play Act essentially codifies 
the landmark decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049 
(9th Cir. 2015), discussed infra Section I.A. McCann, California Game Changer, supra note 7. 
 9. Sam C. Ehrlich, The FLSA and the NCAA’s Potential Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad 
Day, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 77, 78 (2019) (“[T]he call to give student-athletes their fair share [of 
the revenue they generate] has only intensified.”); Billy Witz, California Lawmakers Vote to Undo 
N.C.A.A. Amateurism, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/sports/college-athlete-pay-
california.html [https://perma.cc/XNJ8-XL3H] (Sept. 11, 2019); Robert Pearl, Coronavirus Poses 5 
Huge Threats to the Future of Sports, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2020, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2020/08/25/coronavirus-future-of-sports/#38e02fe0792a 
[https://perma.cc/W5NX-KF8V] (“[T]he death of so-called amateurism in sports has been a long time 
coming.”); see also Alan Blinder & Billy Witz, In Push to Play, College Football Stars Show Sudden 
Unity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/sports/ncaafootball/coronavirus-college-football-players.html 
[https://perma.cc/BRR3-W6KX]. 
 10. Zachary Zagger, Ball in Congress’ Court As States Tackle NCAA Athlete Pay, LAW360.COM 
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.law360.com (search in search bar for “Ball in Congress’ Court As States 
Tackle NCAA Athlete Pay”) (“Since then, however, both Colorado and Florida have passed similar 
legislation to allow college athletes to be paid for the use of their names, images and likenesses—often 
referred to as NIL.”). For a detailed overview of the Florida law, see Steve Berkowitz, Florida Governor 
Signs Bill on College Athletes’ Name, Image and Likeness, USA TODAY: COLLEGE [hereinafter 
Berkowitz, Florida NIL Law], https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/06/12/florida-bill-
college-athletes-name-image-likeness/5347470002/ [https://perma.cc/AF7P-U9HB] (June 12, 2020, 
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California and Colorado laws do not take effect until 2023, Florida’s 
law takes effect on July 1, 2021, forcing the NCAA to make quick 
but substantial adjustments to the governing body’s compensation 
regulations.11 Collectively, these laws represent a tremendous threat 
to the NCAA’s amateurism principles, and over half of the country is 
following suit.12 
 
3:28 PM). For a detailed overview of the Colorado law, see Steve Berkowitz, Colorado Governor Signs 
College Athlete Name, Image and Likeness Bill, USA TODAY: COLLEGE [hereinafter Berkowitz, 
Colorado NIL Law], https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/03/20/colorado-governor-
signs-college-athlete-name-image-likeness-bill/2887481001/ [https://perma.cc/USP7-83RY] (Mar. 20, 
2020, 6:11 PM). 
 11. Dan Murphy, Florida Name, Image, Likeness Bill Now a Law; State Athletes Can Profit from 
Endorsements Next Summer, ESPN (June 12, 2020) [hereinafter Murphy, Florida NIL Law], 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-name-image-likeness-bill-now-law-
meaning-state-athletes-profit-endorsements-next-summer [https://perma.cc/3XR4-72F4] (“Florida’s law 
puts additional pressure on NCAA leaders by significantly shrinking the timeline for them to enact the 
type of uniform national changes they say they prefer.”). Because the California and Colorado laws do 
not go into effect until 2023, experts are pessimistic about the likelihood of such laws having the effect 
their drafters intended, particularly because the NCAA could challenge the legality of such laws. Will 
Hobson & Ben Strauss, The California Governor Signed a Law to Let NCAA Athletes Get Paid. It’s 
Unclear What’s Next., WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/california-lawmakers-voted-to-let-ncaa-athletes-get-
paid-its-unclear-whats-next/2019/09/10/80d0a324-d3e6-11e9-9343-40db57cf6abd_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/U29Z-RQ4P] (“[T]here are reasons to be pessimistic this bill will be implemented in 
2023 as written.”); Dan Murphy, California Defies NCAA As Gov. Gavin Newsom Signs into Law Fair 
Pay to Play Act, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Murphy, California NIL Law], 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27735933/california-defies-ncaa-gov-gavin-newsom-
signs-law-fair-pay-play-act [https://perma.cc/5M2C-FAPU] (“[I]f California and the NCAA remain at 
odds in 2023, the Fair Pay to Play Act will likely lead to lawsuits . . . . The NCAA contends that the new 
law is unconstitutional because it violates rules that protect interstate commerce.”). The Florida law, 
however, contains a number of unique provisions that seem to “represent an attempt to address” some of 
the NCAA’s concerns about the California and Colorado laws—namely, allowing athletes to “more 
easily monetize [NIL] than they can under current NCAA rules.” Berkowitz, Florida NIL Law, supra 
note 10. As a result, “Florida lawmakers believe that their law would [be] less susceptible to legal 
challenge from the NCAA than California’s law because it only directs schools in the state to allow 
athletes to have greater freedom regarding their NIL—it does not address the NCAA.” Id.; see also 
Murphy, California NIL Law, supra. 
 12. Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. Athletes Could Be Paid Under New California Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/sports/college-athletes-paid-california.html 
[https://perma.cc/J3EJ-XX9R] (Oct. 1, 2019) (“The measure . . . threatens the business model of college 
sports.”); Tyler Tynes, The Ripple Effects of California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play’ Act, THE RINGER (Oct. 11, 
2019, 6:55 AM), https://www.theringer.com/2019/10/11/20909171/california-sb-206-ncaa-pay-college-
players [https://perma.cc/6DXR-U83A] (“I don’t want to say this is checkmate, but this is a major 
problem for the NCAA.” (quoting California Governor Gavin Newsom)); Rodger Sherman, The Fair 
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In response to the mounting legislative pressure, the NCAA 
announced that it intends to reform its own NIL policies.13 In 2020, 
the NCAA Board of Governors announced, and the Division I 
Council subsequently approved, its support for a series of proposed 
amendments to the governing body’s NIL rules that would allow 
college athletes to earn previously impermissible forms of 
compensation.14 Exactly how the NCAA plans to implement such 
 
Pay to Play Act Has Been Signed. Now the NCAA Must Address a Question to Which It’s Never Had a 
Good Answer., THE RINGER (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.theringer.com/2019/10/1/20892842/fair-pay-to-play-act-college-sports-california-law-
gavin-newsom [https://perma.cc/48BV-GPNF] (“California’s new bill presents a unique legal threat to 
an organization that’s long clung to an outdated model of amateurism. It also exposes the flaws in each 
argument made by those desperate to prevent this from starting a movement.”); see also Zagger, supra 
note 10 (“The NCAA says a total of [thirty-six] states have introduced similar bills . . . .”). 
 13. Michael McCann, Key Questions, Takeaways from the NCAA’s NIL Announcement, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2019) [hereinafter McCann, NCAA’s NIL Announcement: Key Takeaways], 
https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/30/ncaa-name-image-likeness-announcement-takeaways-questions 
[https://perma.cc/ZFQ4-C5HY] (noting that the NCAA’s Board of Governors voted unanimously on 
October 28, 2019, “to permit college athletes ‘the opportunity to benefit from the use of their [NILs]’” 
(quoting Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, 
NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM) [hereinafter NCAA NIL Announcement], 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-
name-image-and-likeness-opportunities [https://perma.cc/VV65-CLR8])). 
 14. Dan Murphy, NCAA Group Supports Player Endorsement Plan, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2020) 
[hereinafter Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan], https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/29112263/ncaa-group-oks-conditional-player-endorsements [https://perma.cc/54PG-
TSSQ] (discussing the NCAA Board of Governor’s announcement in April of 2020 supporting the 
proposed rules changes); Ralph D. Russo, NCAA Will Vote in January to Change NIL, Transfer Rules, 
AP NEWS (Oct. 14, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/sports-hockey-football-
a27bc79b763a4dcdb8f3586320492588 (discussing the Division I Council’s approval of the proposed 
rules changes in October of 2020); see also Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules Changes, supra 
note 7 (providing an overview of the proposed rules changes). The proposal would “allow college 
athletes to sign endorsement contracts and receive payment for other work, provided that the schools 
they attend [were] not involved in any of the payments.” Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, 
supra. The proposal came from a working group appointed by the NCAA in October of 2019—on the 
heels of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act being signed into law—to investigate potential rules changes 
that would “permit students participating in athletics the opportunity to benefit from the use of their 
[NILs] in a manner consistent with the collegiate model.” NCAA NIL Announcement, supra note 13. The 
NCAA’s initial announcement specified that any adopted reform must maintain the distinction between 
college and professional athletes and “[m]ake clear that compensation for athletics performance or 
participation is impermissible.” Id. Such caveats to the NCAA’s supposed “embrace” of change drew 
considerable criticism as experts speculated about how effective any rules changes may be in actually 
compensating the athletes, let alone compensating them adequately. Ben Pickman, NCAA Votes to Start 
Process Permitting Athletes to Benefit from Likeness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
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reform, however, still remains to be seen.15 In the meantime, the 
NCAA has lobbied Congress to adopt federal legislation that will 
preempt all state laws addressing college athlete NILs, allowing the 
NCAA to retain its dictatorial control over college athlete 
compensation.16 Such federal intervention may not come to the 
 
https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/29/ncaa-student-athlete-likeness-permitted-vote 
[https://perma.cc/6UJE-KLZZ] (Oct. 29, 2019); J. Brady McCollough, News Analysis: NCAA Makes 
Move on Name, Image and Likeness Use, but There’s a Long Way to Go, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019, 
11:34 AM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2019-10-29/ncaa-athletes-nil-college-athletes-profit-
name-image-likeness [https://perma.cc/T8CM-L5QS] (“The NCAA has been signaling for months that 
such benefits would not be actual compensation . . . .” (quoting National College Players Association 
Executive Director Ramogi Huma)); Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules Changes, supra note 7 
(noting that the various restrictions included in the NCAA’s proposed rules changes—which provide 
universities broad discretion to regulate any permissible marketing endeavors for college athletes—
could make the proposed changes “functionally useless,” such that the amendments would “do little to 
change the current exploitative state of college athletes” (quoting Connecticut Senator Richard 
Blumenthal)). 
 15. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14. Though the working group proposed 
recommendations that would allow athletes to earn compensation for the use of their NILs, the 
recommendations must still go through the formal rulemaking process, which may take months or even 
years to implement. Id.; see also Barrett Sallee & Adam Silverstein, NCAA Takes Big Step Toward 
Allowing Name, Image and Likeness Compensation for Athletes, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 29, 2020, 9:52 
AM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-takes-big-step-toward-allowing-name-
image-and-likeness-compensation-for-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/6LEM-F4KP]. In October of 2020, the 
Division I Council approved the working group’s proposed rules changes to be formally voted on for 
adoption in January of 2021. See Russo, supra note 14. The Council ultimately delayed the official vote 
in mid-January, however, citing “several external factors,” such as “judicial, political and enforcement 
issues,” as the reason for the delay. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Division I Council Tables Proposals on 
Name, Image, Likeness and Transfers, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2021, 6:48 PM), 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/division-i-council-tables-proposals-name-
image-likeness-and-transfers [https://perma.cc/GWC6-S4RF]. Nonetheless, the NCAA’s proposed NIL 
rules changes are still significantly more restrictive than the laws passed in states such as California, 
Colorado, and Florida—a contrast that could spur eventual legal action absent federal intervention. 
Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14; see also Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed 
Rules Changes, supra note 7 (observing that the NCAA’s proposed rules changes fall far short of 
providing similar autonomy to the athletes as provided by state legislation, which “could put the NCAA 
at odds with the provisions of laws that have [already] been passed by four states”). 
 16. Ross Dellenger, NCAA Presents Congress with Bold Proposal for NIL Legislation, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2020) [Dellenger, NCAA’s Congressional NIL Proposal], 
https://www.si.com/college/2020/07/31/ncaa-sends-congress-nil-legislation-proposal 
[https://perma.cc/378U-AV55]; see also Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14 (“The 
NCAA sees a federal solution as vital to avoid trying to operate a nationwide organization with a 
patchwork of different state laws.”); Berkowitz, Colorado NIL Law, supra note 10 (“The NCAA has 
asked for help from Congress as it faces the possibility of state-by-state action . . . .”). Although 
Congress may not be overly sympathetic to the NCAA’s predicament, the NCAA recognizes that it 
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NCAA’s rescue as quickly as the governing body would like, 
however, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic.17 
 
desperately needs Congress’s help to maintain its relevancy. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, 
supra note 14 (“It’s clear we need Congress’s help in all of this.” (quoting NCAA President Mark 
Emmert)); see also Steve Berkowitz, Judge’s Ruling Stands: NCAA Can’t Limit College Athletes’ 
Benefits That Are Tied to Education, USA TODAY: COLLEGE (May 18, 2020, 4:09 PM) [hereinafter 
Berkowitz, Judge’s Ruling Stands], https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/05/18/ncaa-
cant-limit-college-athletes-benefits-tied-education-ruling/5213391002/ [https://perma.cc/ZD4N-V5F7] 
(“Given the billions of dollars the NCAA makes, I don’t think they’ll have a sympathetic ear in 
Congress.” (quoting attorney and athletes’ rights advocate Steve Berman)). 
 17. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14 (“Federal legislators ha[d] shown 
interest in creating laws about how college athletes are paid in the past year, but the [COVID-19] 
pandemic and . . . presidential election present[ed] obstacles to quickly passing any legislation.”). 
Ironically, even though the pandemic and the presidential election affected Congress’s ability to pass 
swift legislation, these events and the national push for racial justice that occurred during the summer of 
2020 spurred federal legislators into action to address the inequities of college athletes. Dan Murphy, 
U.S. Senators Lay Out Framework for Future College Sports Legislation, ESPN (Aug. 13, 2020) 
[hereinafter Murphy, Framework for Federal College Sports Legislation], 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29651474/senators-lay-framework-future-college-
sports-legislation [https://perma.cc/2E96-TK7A] (“This isn’t radical thinking . . . . It’s just the right 
thing to do.” (quoting Connecticut Senator Chris Murphy)); see also Murphy, Congressional NIL 
Options, supra note 7 (discussing four forms of proposed federal legislation). In response, nine U.S. 
senators published a “College Athletes Bill of Rights” that identified a “list of items they [saw] as 
important rights belonging to college athletes that they hope to soon protect or enforce with federal 
laws.” Murphy, Framework for Federal College Sports Legislation, supra; see also Ross Dellenger, 
Inside the Landmark College Athletes Bill of Rights Being Introduced in Congress, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Dellenger, Landmark College Athletes Bill of Rights], 
https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/17/athlete-bill-of-rights-congress-ncaa-football 
[https://perma.cc/WFJ3-2RXK] (detailing the College Athletes Bill of Rights that was formally 
proposed in mid-December of 2020). Congress then took a gigantic step toward enacting federal 
legislation that implicates the operation of college athletics in September of 2020 by proposing 
bipartisan legislation that would allow college athletes to earn compensation from endorsement deals. 
Dan Murphy, Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill Introduced for College Sports, ESPN (Sept. 24, 2020) 
[hereinafter Murphy, Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill], https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/29961059/bipartisan-federal-nil-bill-introduced-college-sports 
[https://perma.cc/U4VN-ETS7]. Much to the NCAA’s chagrin, however, the bill “stops short of 
implementing all of the restrictions that the NCAA and other college sports administrators have asked 
Congress to help them impose.” Id. But see Ross Dellenger, In Significant Step Around NCAA Athlete 
Rights, New Name, Image and Likeness Bill to Be Introduced in Congress, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 
10, 2020) [hereinafter Dellenger, Congress Introduces NIL Bill], 
https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/10/ncaa-name-image-likeness-bill-congress 
[https://perma.cc/NPH8-AHA3] (discussing one piece of proposed federal legislation, introduced by 
former Commerce Committee Chair and current Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker, which would 
provide antitrust protections for the NCAA and “prohibit schools from classifying athletes as 
employees”). In fact, the legislation could have an opposite effect to what the NCAA had hoped for as 
one of the bill’s co-authors even expressed optimism that the bill could represent “an interim step on a 
 
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/7
2021] AMATEUR HOUR IS OVER 481 
The COVID-19 pandemic spurred an unprecedented response from 
the NCAA and its Division I affiliates that threatened the very 
existence of college sports as a whole.18 First, the NCAA canceled 
the 2020 Division I men’s and women’s basketball tournaments and 
ceased competition of 2020 spring sports entirely.19 Then, after 
monitoring the development of the pandemic over the summer of 
2020, numerous Division I conferences and countless Division II and 
Division III programs canceled football seasons and fall sports as 
well.20 The NCAA itself, however, failed to issue any semblance of a 
directive to its member institutions, instead allowing the institutions 
to adopt their own contingency plans, leading to significant discord 
among even the most powerful conferences in Division I.21 The lack 
 
path toward eventually giving college athletes an opportunity to be paid like professionals.” Murphy, 
Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill, supra. Ironically, the very same federal legislation that the NCAA once 
viewed as its saving grace could end up codifying the abolishment of its amateurism principles. 
 18. Jeff Gordon, Tipsheet: NCAA Football Facing Upheaval from Players, Power 5 Conferences, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/columns/jeff-
gordon/tipsheet-ncaa-football-facing-upheaval-from-players-power-5-conferences/article_3343c775-
8fea-5f5b-b2c6-ecd1e6a366a0.html [https://perma.cc/7YBL-VL9Y] (“College sports in general—and 
college football in particular—[are] threatening to implode in the face of the global pandemic.”). 
 19. David M. Hale, A Timeline of College Sports’ Postponements, Return-to-Play Rules and 
Cancellations, ESPN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/29633084/a-
line-college-sports-postponements-return-play-rules-cancellations [https://perma.cc/9EYW-PNMT]. 
 20. Id.; Gordon, supra note 18. 
 21. Dennis Dodd, College Football Playoff to Be Played As Scheduled After 2020 Season with No 
Plans for Spring 2021, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 24, 2020, 7:08 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
football/news/college-football-playoff-to-be-played-as-scheduled-after-2020-season-with-no-plans-for-
spring-2021/ [https://perma.cc/855F-JHMH]. Two of the so-called Power Five conferences, the Big Ten 
and the Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), originally postponed their 2020 football seasons before 
following the lead of the remaining Power Five conferences (the Southeastern Conference (SEC), 
Atlantic Coastal Conference (ACC), and Big 12) in announcing plans to compete in a limited, 
conference-only schedule. Id.; Alan Blinder, Pac-12 Will Play Football in 2020, Joining Other Top 
Leagues During the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/sports/ncaafootball/coronavirus-pac-12-restart.html 
[https://perma.cc/SG2X-HT8C]; Heather Dinich & Adam Rittenberg, Inside the Meeting That Saved the 
Big Ten Football Season, ESPN (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-
football/story/_/id/29939665/inside-meeting-saved-big-ten-football-season [https://perma.cc/279H-
LRTW]. For a detailed overview of each conference’s respective response to the 2020 college football 
season, see Will There Be College Football This Fall? A Conference-by-Conference Breakdown, ESPN 
(Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/29636505/will-there-college-
football-fall-conference-conference-breakdown [https://perma.cc/5V3R-TVP3]. 
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of centralized leadership pushed the athletes to the brink, resulting in 
collective groups of players threatening to opt out of competition for 
fall sports while unifying to advocate for economic, social, and racial 
equality.22 Experts speculate that such a response by the athletes and 
 
 22. Gordon, supra note 18. On August 9, 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Clemson 
quarterback Trevor Lawrence issued a statement via Twitter advocating for the creation of a college 
football players association. Trevor Lawrence (@Trevorlawrencee), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2020, 12:01 
AM), https://twitter.com/Trevorlawrencee/status/1292672300152758273?s=20 (demanding that the 
NCAA and affiliated conferences establish health and safety procedures to protect athletes during the 
pandemic, allow athletes the opportunity to opt out of competition during the pandemic, and allow the 
athletes of the Power Five conferences to unionize). The announcement unified college football players 
associated with the #WeAreUnited and #WeWantToPlay movements, representing the single largest 
culmination of player advocacy in the history of college athletics. Derek Silva et al., Cancelling the 
College Football Season Is About Union Busting, Not Health, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2020, 7:34 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2020/aug/12/cancelling-the-college-football-season-is-about-
union-busting-not-health [https://perma.cc/HQ85-V9YK]; Blinder & Witz, supra note 9; Ryan 
Kostecka, How Pac-12’s #WeAreUnited Came to Be College Football’s #WeWantToPlay, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/utah/football/how-pac-12s-weareunited-
came-to-be-college-footballs-wewanttoplay [https://perma.cc/882K-R7SD]. For a detailed discussion of 
the #WeAreUnited movement, established by athletes in the Pac-12, see Players of the Pac-12, 
#WeAreUnited, THE PLAYERS’ TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2020), https://www.theplayerstribune.com/en-
us/articles/pac-12-players-covid-19-statement-football-season [https://perma.cc/TGB4-GK7T]. A 
collection of Big Ten college football players also issued a list of demands similar to those of the 
Pac-12’s #WeAreUnited movement, though the Big Ten’s announcement focused entirely on 
protections against the COVID-19 pandemic. Mark Schlabach, Big Ten Players Follow Pac-12, Form 
Unity Group to Address Concerns, ESPN (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-
football/story/_/id/29601344/like-pac-12-big-ten-players-form-unity-group-address-concerns 
[https://perma.cc/D9SA-WQ8X]. This movement caught the eyes of federal legislators as well, nine of 
whom authored the College Athletes Bill of Rights, discussed supra note 17, which addressed many of 
the same issues and concerns as the Pac-12 and Big Ten movements. See Murphy, Framework for 
Federal College Sports Legislation, supra note 17. For a detailed overview of the College Athletes Bill 
of Rights, formally introduced to Congress in December of 2020, see Steve Berkowitz, Democratic 
Senators Introduce ‘College Athletes Bill of Rights’ That Could Reshape NCAA, USA Today: College 
(Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Berkowitz, Democrats Introduce College Athletes Bill of Rights], 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/12/17/ncaa-overhaul-come-democrats-college-
athletes-bill-rights/3935483001/ [https://perma.cc/WQ8Z-2UD5]. The weight of the Pac-12 and Big 
Ten’s unionization efforts faltered slightly in the eyes of the public, however, as both conferences 
initially announced plans to postpone their respective 2020 football seasons before then reversing course 
and announcing an abbreviated, conference-only schedule—following the lead of their Power Five 
counterparts, albeit in delayed fashion. Graham Hays & Mechelle Voepel, Big Ten, Pac-12 Postpone 
Fall College Football: What You Need to Know, ESPN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-
football/story/_/id/29640578/big-ten-pac-12-postpone-fall-college-football-need-know 
[https://perma.cc/7PUX-HKYH]; Pat Forde & Ross Dellenger, First Power 5 Dominoes Fall As Big 
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conferences could push some conferences to break away from the 
NCAA and provide the athletes with expanded healthcare benefits or 
pay the athletes outright, effectively ending amateurism.23  
In the midst of the ongoing legislative and societal battles 
addressing the NCAA’s amateurism principles, recent judicial 
developments may have accelerated the imminent upheaval of 
amateurism in one fell swoop.24 A class of former men’s and 
women’s college athletes led by Shawne Alston, a former football 
 
[https://perma.cc/G5K3-6QAH]; see also Blinder, supra note 21; Dinich & Rittenberg, supra note 21. 
Regardless, the unprecedented outpouring of support for the athletes’ unionization efforts is sure to have 
lasting effects in the collective fight against the NCAA’s amateurism principles. Blinder & Witz, supra 
note 9 (“Regardless of the outcome of the debate about the football season, ‘[the] burst of activism was 
certain to intensify the protracted debate over the rights of players, an issue that has been the subject of 
lawsuits, legislation and congressional hearings.”). 
 23. Gordon, supra note 18 (“By cancelling those (fall) championships, the board might set in motion 
an eventual breakaway from the NCAA by the Power Five . . . . Simply put, those power conferences 
have thought for a while they could [operate college football] better than the NCAA.” (quoting Dennis 
Dodd of CBSSports.com)); Joshua Drew & Stephen A. Miller, Coronavirus Pandemic May Force Shift 
in Oversight of College Sports, LAW.COM: THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 19, 2020, 12:13 PM), 
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2020/10/19/coronavirus-pandemic-may-force-shift-in-
oversight-of-college-sports/ (discussing the COVID-19 pandemic’s “forced modernization of the 
NCAA” that raised “significant questions about the NCAA’s future” and the possibility and feasibility 
of a “new major conference athletic association” independent from the NCAA); see also Amanda Mull, 
College Football’s Great Unraveling, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/08/college-football-falling-apart/615277/ 
[https://perma.cc/JBS6-EMPT] (“But if conferences are intent on playing, Power [Five] universities 
could reject the dangers of amateurism by, at the very least, paying players a fair wage and providing 
expanded health benefits for their perilous and near-limitlessly profitable work.”). Scholars speculate 
that conferences choosing to cancel football seasons—or fall sport seasons entirely—in the wake of the 
COVID-19 pandemic stemmed more from an institutional fear of college athletes organizing and 
unionizing rather than an effort to ensure athlete safety. Silva et al., supra note 22. The threat of 
players—especially a collective group of players representing an entire conference—opting out of a 
competitive season represents the greatest protest of its kind against the NCAA’s reign over college 
athletics. Gordon, supra note 18 (“[T]he most forceful [threat] came . . . with the announcement that a 
group of Pac-12 players [were] threatening to opt out of playing until a number of economic, racial 
justice and safety issues [were] addressed.” (quoting Bill Connelly of ESPN.com)); Blinder & Witz, 
supra note 9 (“The way athletes urgently came together . . . demonstrated a breadth to their unity that 
had not existed before.”). Such a unified push could add a nail in the coffin of amateurism and 
significantly speed up its imminent demise. Id. 
 24. See generally Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th 
Cir. 2020); see also Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 99 (speculating that an antitrust decision against the NCAA 
could alter how courts analyze challenges against the NCAA under other legal theories, such as under 
federal labor laws). 
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player at West Virginia University, challenged the NCAA’s 
compensation regulations capping grant-in-aid scholarship limits at 
the cost of attendance.25 In March of 2019, Judge Wilken of the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California, who has earned 
a reputation as a staunch opponent to the NCAA’s compensation 
regulations,26 issued an injunction prohibiting the NCAA from 
limiting grant-in-aid scholarships and education-related benefits at 
less than the cost of attendance after finding that such caps violated 
federal antitrust law.27 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Wilken’s ruling just one 
year later in May of 2020.28 Then, in a decision that shocked the 
 
 25. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1061–62; Berkowitz, Judge’s Ruling Stands, supra note 16 (“A 
three-judge panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals [for the Ninth Circuit] . . . unanimously upheld a 
district judge’s ruling that the NCAA cannot limit education-related benefits that college athletes can 
receive.”); see also Michael McCann, Why the NCAA Lost Its Latest Landmark Case in the Battle Over 
What Schools Can Offer Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 8, 2019, 10:45 PM) [hereinafter 
McCann, NCAA Landmark Loss], https://sports.yahoo.com/why-ncaa-lost-latest-landmark-
034532251.html [https://perma.cc/6GT8-QNND]. The NCAA permits universities to award athletic 
scholarships to college athletes, known as “grants-in-aid.” Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1063. The NCAA 
has revised its definition of permissible benefits encompassed by this grant-in-aid several times since its 
original enactment in 1956. Id. at 1063–64. Following the adoption of the autonomy-structure legislative 
process in 2014, the Power Five conferences voted to amend the NCAA’s definition of “grant-in-aid” in 
response to the ongoing litigation in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (O’Bannon I), 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). Alston I, 
375 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. Currently, a full grant-in-aid scholarship comprises “tuition and fees, room and 
board, books and other expenses related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of attendance.” Id.  
 26. Judge Wilken was also the presiding district court judge in the landmark O’Bannon case 
discussed infra Section I.A. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955. 
 27. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1109–10. 
 28. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston II), 
958 F.3d 1239, 1266 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s “liability determination and 
injunction in all respects”). Though the Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Wilken’s injunction, the NCAA 
quickly petitioned the Supreme Court in August of 2020 to stay the injunction, but the Court denied the 
request just a week later. Steve Berkowitz, Supreme Court Denies NCAA’s Request for Stay of 
Injunction in Case on Athlete Benefits, USA TODAY: SPORTS, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2020/08/11/supreme-court-denies-ncaa-request-athlete-
benefits/3344086001/ [https://perma.cc/TUZ8-X63T] (Aug. 11, 2020, 12:37 PM) (“[Justice] Kagan’s 
ruling sets the stage for at least one recruiting cycle in which schools will be able to decide on a 
conference-level basis whether to allow offers to football, men’s basketball and/or women’s basketball 
players that go beyond covering the full cost of attending school.”). The NCAA subsequently petitioned 
the Supreme Court in October of 2020 to officially grant full review of the case. NCAA Statement 
Regarding Supreme Court Petition for Alston Case, NCAA (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:32 AM) [hereinafter 
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college sports world, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to take the 
case in December of 2020, agreeing to review the NCAA’s 
amateurism principles for the first time in over thirty-five years.29 
The case, In re National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic 
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation (Alston),30 carries significant 
legal implications stretching far beyond the realm of antitrust law.31 
Specifically, the language used in Judge Wilken’s order could 
transform the analysis of a challenge to classify college athletes as 
employees under federal labor laws.32 
The landscape of college athletics is on the verge of a monumental 
transformation that threatens the very existence of the NCAA.33 This 
 
NCAA Petitions Supreme Court], http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-
statement-regarding-supreme-court-petition-alston-case [https://perma.cc/87AT-FZQC]. 
 29. Robert Barnes & Rick Maese, Supreme Court Will Hear NCAA Dispute over Compensation for 
Student-Athletes, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2020, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-ncaa/2020/12/16/90f20dbc-3fa9-
11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html [https://perma.cc/6RYZ-7JKC]. The Court’s grant of cert. came as 
a shock to experts because the Court declined to take up the O’Bannon case just five years prior. Joe 
Nocera, Opinion, Supreme Court Can End the College Sports Charade, POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 2020, 
6:00 AM) [hereinafter Nocera, College Sports Charade], https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-
Ed/2020/12/19/Joe-Nocera-Supreme-Court-can-end-the-college-sports-charade/stories/202012190007 
[https://perma.cc/EKL2-ZBRZ]. The Court last took up a case involving the NCAA in the landmark 
1984 case National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 
U.S. 85 (1984). Barnes & Maese, supra. 
 30. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058; Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239. 
 31. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 98–99 (explaining that a ruling in an antitrust case allowing colleges 
and universities to provide grant-in-aid scholarships to athletes beyond the cost of attendance could 
allow future courts to find that college athletes qualify as employees under federal labor laws); 
Berkowitz, Judge’s Ruling Stands, supra note 16 (acknowledging that the district court’s decision and 
the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent affirmance represents a landmark victory for college athletes and “opens 
the door for more challenges” to the NCAA’s amateurism principles in the future). 
 32. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 98–99. Though the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed Judge Wilken’s 
order, this Note focuses specifically on the language used in the original order. Judge Wilken’s 
deliberate use of specific terminology, discussed infra Section II.A, carries potentially damning 
implications for the NCAA’s amateurism principles that apply to various areas of law outside of the 
antitrust context. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 98–99. In affirming Judge Wilken’s order, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted Judge Wilken’s factual findings and thus her use of such specific terminology. Alston II, 958 
F.3d at 1244. 
 33. Gordon, supra note 18 (“[W]ithin a calendar year, college athletics will be operating in a 
seismically different way.” (quoting Pete Thamel of Yahoo! Sports)); Pat Forde, An Unprecedented 
Athlete Push Caps a Surreal Weekend As College Football Drama Intensifies, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/08/10/college-football-updates-status-players-union 
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Note explains how abandoning the NCAA’s amateurism principles 
by formally recognizing college athletes as employees under federal 
labor laws may be the only way to preserve college athletics as we 
know it. Judge Wilken’s analysis, though applied in an antitrust 
challenge, can be translated into the context of a challenge under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to find that college athletes of 
revenue-generating sports like Division I men’s basketball and 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) football qualify as employees of 
their universities and the NCAA.34 
Part I provides a contextual background of the NCAA’s 
amateurism principles while examining how those principles have 
transformed through antitrust and employment litigation. Part II 
analyzes the language and judicial scrutiny of amateurism in Judge 
Wilken’s district court order in Alston and then translates that 
analysis to the context of an FLSA challenge, recognizing college 
athletes of revenue-generating sports as employees. Finally, Part III 
proposes that the NCAA abandon its amateurism principles once and 
for all and provide college athletes with the compensation and 
protection they are entitled to under the FLSA. This Note proposes 
two methods that allow the NCAA and its member institutions to 
operate in compliance with the FLSA while preserving the distinction 
between college and professional sports. 
 
[https://perma.cc/K88B-WRS2] (speculating that, had the NCAA “terminate[d] the flawed concept of 
amateurism in a timely fashion,” the implications of the cancellations caused by COVID-19 may have 
been minimized); Blinder & Witz, supra note 9; see also Pearl, supra note 9 (“[T]he death of so-called 
amateurism in sports has been a long time coming.”). 
 34. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 99 (“[A] ruling in the antitrust cases that allows for colleges and 
universities to pay student-athletes beyond these elements could lead a future court . . . to decide that a 
future plaintiff who receives grant-in-aid beyond qualified expenses . . . is an employee under the 
FLSA.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
In 2018, college athletics programs generated $14 billion in total 
revenue.35 Of that $14 billion, $7.6 billion came from programs in the 
Power Five conferences (Atlantic Coastal Conference (ACC), Big 
Ten, Big 12, Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), and Southeastern 
Conference (SEC)).36 Schools from these conferences have engaged 
in an athletics “arms race” of sorts, nearly doubling the amount of 
spending towards personnel, facilities, and other athletic amenities 
from 2004 to 2014.37 The NCAA and its member institutions have 
also inked billion-dollar broadcast deals, adding to a revenue pot that 
actually exceeds that of its professional counterparts.38 Yet among 
the sixty-five Power Five programs, only 12% of all athletic revenue 
ultimately finds its way to the athletes in the form of grant-in-aid 
scholarships.39 
The NCAA and its member institutions, while enjoying 
tax-exempt, non-profit status, currently deny athletes a meaningful 
share of the revenue for fear of blurring the “line of demarcation 
 
 35. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 3. Over the course of fifteen years—from 2003 to 2018—the total 
revenue generated by college athletics rose from $4 billion to $14 billion. Id. 
 36. Id. at 5. For context, there are 2,078 institutions with athletic programs under the NCAA 
umbrella and only sixty-five institutions in the Power Five conferences. Id. (noting that 3% of college 
programs generated 54% of all college sports revenue in 2018). Thirty-six of these programs reported 
more than $100 million in revenue, eleven reported more than $150 million, and two reported over $200 
million. Id. 
 37. Id. at 12. For example, schools have reported apparel deals totaling $173.8 million, $252 million, 
and $280 million. Id. 
 38. Murphy, NC NIL Bill, supra note 2 (noting that, in 2016, CBS and Turner Sports signed an 
eight-year, $8.8 billion extension to broadcast the NCAA Tournament through 2032, bringing the 
current contract to a cumulative twenty-two-year deal worth $19.6 billion); MURPHY, supra note 1, at 2 
(noting that the 2019 NCAA Tournament brought in a total of $1.2 billion in media revenue, boasting a 
$1 million price tag to purchase a thirty-second commercial spot). The $14 billion in total revenue 
reported in 2018 by the Power Five conferences was more than every professional sports league in the 
world, except for the National Football League (NFL). MURPHY, supra note 1, at 3; see also Kassandra 
Ramsey, Alston v. NCAA: Judge Rules for Plaintiffs but NCAA Keeps Amateurism, UNAFRAID SHOW 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://unafraidshow.com/alston-ncaa-ruling-amateur-college-sports/ (comparing the 
similarities of broadcast deals garnered at the collegiate level to those at the professional level).  
 39. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 7. In contrast, 16% of athletic revenue goes to salaries for coaches. Id. 
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between college athletics and professional sports” that is supposedly 
essential to preserving the spirit of college athletics.40 To maintain 
the distinction between collegiate and professional athletes, the 
NCAA concocted its concept of amateurism.41 
Purportedly entrenched as a “revered tradition” of college 
athletics, the NCAA formed its amateurism principles in the 1950s 
following a workers’ compensation challenge by a university 
employee for injuries sustained during a spring football practice.42 In 
response to the ruling, the NCAA issued a memo to its member 
schools introducing the label “student-athlete” to discourage future 
employer liability litigation.43 Though the concept of amateurism 
quickly developed into a mainstay requirement in the NCAA’s 
Division I Bylaws, the NCAA never took the time to define the 
term.44 Thus, the lack of clarity and evidentiary support surrounding 
 
 40. Colwell, supra note 3, at 931 n.221 (quoting Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From Regulating 
Organization to Multi-Billion Dollar Business: The NCAA Is Commercializing the Amateur Competition 
It Has Taken Almost a Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 321 (2003)); MURPHY, supra 
note 1, at 2 (“Meanwhile, tax-exempt non-profit institutions of higher education condone and endorse 
broadcasting and apparel contracts that surpass $250 million, coaches’ salaries that beat their 
professional equivalents, and lavish spending on facilities that amount to amusement parks aimed at 
seducing the nation’s top teenagers in their sport.”); see also NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1. 
 41. Lonick, supra note 1, at 140. 
 42. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)); Univ. of Denver 
v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 424 (Colo. 1953) (en banc) (finding that injuries to a student-employee of the 
university resulting from a spring football practice arose out of and in the context of his employment 
even though he was employed to maintain tennis courts and not to play football). 
 43. Lonick, supra note 1, at 140. The NCAA also strongly encouraged all member institutions to 
include the word “amateurism” directly in all grant-in-aid athletic scholarships. Id. 
 44. See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“The ‘Principle of Amateurism,’ as 
described in the current version of the NCAA’s constitution, uses the word ‘amateurs’ to describe the 
amateurism principle, and is thus circular.”), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Alston II, 958 
F.3d 1239, 1259 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Amateurism does not have a fixed definition, as NCAA officials 
themselves have conceded.”). See generally NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 12. Article 
2.9 of the 2019–20 NCAA Division I Manual describes the “Principle of Amateurism,” providing that 
“[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be 
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from 
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.” NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at 
art. 2.9. Notably, however, nothing in the NCAA’s Division I Bylaws directly links compensation with 
 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/7
2021] AMATEUR HOUR IS OVER 489 
this concept of amateurism has left the area “ripe for litigation.”45 
Former athletes have challenged the NCAA’s amateurism principles 
under various legal theories, but antitrust law has represented the 
most direct threat thus far.46 
A. Overview of Antitrust Challenges to the NCAA’s Amateurism 
Principles 
Antitrust law governs anticompetitive practices and unreasonable 
restraints of trade.47 Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits 
“[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce.”48 In determining whether a restraint of trade is 
unreasonable, a court may consider the nature or character of the 
contracts at issue, or the surrounding circumstances giving rise to an 
inference or presumption of intent to restrain trade.49 To state a claim 
under section 1, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy that (2) unreasonably restrains 
trade—under either a per se rule of illegality or rule of reason 
analysis—that (3) affects interstate commerce.50 
Traditionally, courts have afforded the NCAA broad latitude under 
antitrust challenges because the “integrity of the ‘product’ [of college 
athletics] cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement.”51 As a 
 
the concept of amateurism. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1098–99 (“The Principle [of Amateurism] does 
not mention or address compensation . . . . Accordingly, no link appears between this principle and the 
challenged compensation limits.”). 
 45. Colwell, supra note 3. 
 46. Lucas Novaes, Comment, It’s Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes’ Rights: Implications of 
Columbia University on the Collective Bargaining Rights of College Athletes, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1533, 
1561 (2017). 
 47. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98. 
 48. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 49. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103 (“Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is confined to a 
consideration of impact on competitive conditions.”). 
 50. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1256 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 51. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[R]estraints on competition are essential if 
the product is to be available at all.” (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02)). 
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result, courts have typically subjected NCAA practices to the rule of 
reason analysis.52 The rule of reason analysis places the initial burden 
on the challenger to establish anticompetitive effects within a 
relevant market.53 The burden then shifts to the defendant to offer 
justification with evidence of the alleged restraint’s procompetitive 
effects.54 If any legitimate procompetitive objectives exist, the 
plaintiff must then show that those objectives are achievable through 
substantially less restrictive means, or the challenge fails.55 
The “first serious legal challenge to the NCAA’s amateurism 
rules” came in the 2014 case O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n.56 There, the same Judge Wilken of the Northern 
District of California found that NCAA rules restraining the ability of 
schools to compensate college athletes for the use of their NILs 
violated the rule of reason analysis.57 On appeal, however, the Ninth 
Circuit narrowed the impact of Judge Wilken’s ruling significantly, 
vacating a $5,000 stipend award to the challengers to avoid 
eradicating the NCAA’s amateurism principles.58 Judge Wilken took 
the Ninth Circuit’s concerns to heart when writing her order in 
Alston, finding—albeit hesitantly—that there may be some 
 
 52. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (“But where, as here, a ‘certain degree of cooperation’ is 
necessary to market college sports, the Rule of Reason [analysis] is appropriate.” (citing O’Bannon II, 
802 F.3d at 1069)). 
 53. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1070. 
 54. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 335–36 (7th Cir. 2012) (“If the plaintiff 
meets his burden, the defendant can show that the restraint in question actually has a procompetitive 
effect on balance, while the plaintiff can dispute this claim or show that the restraint in question is not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the procompetitive objective.”). 
 55. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1070 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 56. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Joe Nocera, O’Bannon Ruling Stands, but NCAA’s Status Quo May Yet Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2016) [hereinafter Nocera, O’Bannon Ruling Stands], http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/sports/ncaa-
obannon-case-ruling-supreme-court.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3RFF-CGTU]. 
 57. See generally O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955. 
 58. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1078–79 (“The difference between offering student-athletes 
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not 
minor; it is a quantum leap.”); Nocera, O’Bannon Ruling Stands, supra note 56. 
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legitimacy to a narrow portion of the NCAA’s amateurism 
principles.59 Even in issuing a ruling that kept the core of the 
NCAA’s amateurism principles intact, however, Judge Wilken may 
have opened Pandora’s box for future challenges seeking to classify 
college athletes as employees under federal labor laws.60 
B. FLSA Challenges and the Economic Reality Test 
Though antitrust challenges may represent the most persistent 
threat to the NCAA’s amateurism principles thus far, they offer a 
relatively minimal likelihood of redress to current athletes.61 
Challenges under federal labor laws, however, could prove to upend 
the concept entirely while also providing college athletes with 
 
 59. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1082–83 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“The Court does credit the 
importance to consumer demand of maintaining a distinction between college sports and professional 
sports. . . . [T]he distinction . . . arises [only] because student-athletes do not receive unlimited payments 
unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports leagues.”), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th 
Cir. 2020); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We further conclude that the record 
supports the factual findings underlying the injunction and that the district court’s analysis is faithful to 
our decision in [O’Bannon II], 802 F.3d 1049.”). Critics in the arena viewed Judge Wilken’s ruling as a 
“middle ground of sorts in a case that had the potential to shatter the college sports economy.” Maclean 
& Novy-Williams, supra note 7. The potential impact of this decision should not be overlooked, 
however, because it still delivered a critical blow to the NCAA’s principles of amateurism. Id. (“The big 
picture for me is that once again the courts have deemed the NCAA rules to be a violation of antitrust 
laws.” (quoting Boston College’s Carroll School of Management sports business professor Warren 
Zola)). 
 60. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1088; Will Hobson, For Former Athletes Fighting NCAA 
Amateurism Rules, a Muted Victory, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2019, 6:33 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/for-former-athletes-fighting-ncaa-amateurism-rules-a-
muted-victory/2019/03/12/53ea96c0-44fe-11e9-aaf8-4512a6fe3439_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WPW-JSM3]. The Supreme Court granted cert. to review the case in December of 
2020, just seven months after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Wilken’s ruling. 
Barnes & Maese, supra note 29. The Court’s decision to review the NCAA’s amateurism principles for 
the first time in over thirty-five years comes “at a time when the college sports landscape is rapidly 
shifting and the NCAA’s longtime amateurism model faces attacks on multiple fronts.” Id. Experts have 
opined that the Court’s surprising decision to review the case suggests that the Court recognizes that this 
case “strikes directly at the NCAA’s power and authority” and could “fundamentally transform the 
century-old institution of NCAA sports.” Id. 
 61. Novaes, supra note 46, at 1560–62 (observing that although the NCAA has faced challenges to 
the amateurism principles under various legal theories, the “most direct threats” to the principles have 
come from challenges “in the antitrust realm”). 
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immediate protection and compensation.62 The FLSA provides 
protection for covered employees in the form of guaranteed 
minimum wage and overtime rates for work performed over the 
forty-hour threshold in a single week.63 Congress enacted the FLSA 
to protect covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive 
working hours.64 Congress did not, however, explicitly define the 
parameters of an employer–employee relationship covered under the 
FLSA.65 Thus, the difficulty lies in determining who qualifies as a 
covered “employee.”66 Specifically, in the context of college athletes 
seeking FLSA protection, challengers thus far have been 
unsuccessful in convincing courts that participation in intercollegiate 
athletics constitutes “work” for an “employer.”67 
 
 62. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 80 (“A win on FLSA grounds . . . would seemingly assure college 
athletes minimum wage and time-and-a-half for any time worked over forty hours.”). 
 63. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
 64. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 147 (2012) (citing Barrentine v. 
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)). 
 65. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947). 
 66. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 67. See generally Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (arguing 
that a college football player at the University of Southern California qualified as an employee of the 
Pac-12 and the NCAA under the FLSA through the joint-employer doctrine); Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (arguing that women’s track athletes at the University of 
Pennsylvania qualified as employees of the university under the FLSA); Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n (Livers II), No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (arguing that a 
college football player at Villanova University qualified as an employee of the university and the NCAA 
under the FLSA through the joint-employer doctrine); Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B., No. 167, 
1350 (2015) (arguing that college football players at Northwestern University qualified as employees of 
the university under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and were thus entitled to unionize to 
protect their employee interests). To qualify as an employee under the FLSA, the plaintiff must establish 
that they perform work for an employer. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290. The FLSA provides only vague 
definitions of the terms “employee” (“any individual employed by an employer”) and “employer” (“any 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employee in relation to an employee”), however, 
and remains silent on what constitutes requisite “work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)–(e). 
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1. Berger’s “Long-Standing Tradition” of Amateurism and the 
Revenue Caveat 
Though college athletes had attempted to gain employee 
recognition in different contexts, the first challenge under the FLSA 
to gain traction in federal courts came in the 2016 case Berger v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.68 There, members of the 
University of Pennsylvania track team argued that they qualified as 
employees of the university within the meaning of the FLSA and 
were thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime compensation.69 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that, due 
to the FLSA’s circular definition of “employee” and “employer,” 
examination of the “‘“economic reality” of the working relationship’ 
between the alleged employee and the alleged employer [was 
required] to decide whether Congress intended the FLSA to apply to 
that particular relationship.”70 The court held that the NCAA’s 
“long-standing tradition” of amateurism defined the economic reality 
of the relationship between the athletes and the institutions.71 The 
court ultimately affirmed dismissal of the athletes’ claim, observing 
that the tradition of amateurism stood for the principle that college 
athletes voluntarily participate in their respective sports without “any 
real expectation of earning an income.”72 As a result, the court held 
that a college athlete’s “play” did not equate to “work” entitling the 
athletes to employee coverage under the FLSA.73 
 
 68. 843 F.3d at 290–92. 
 69. Id. at 289. 
 70. Id. at 290 (citing Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808). The Supreme Court has instructed courts to adopt a 
broad construction of “employee” and “employer” under the FLSA, but the definitions are not limitless. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y 
of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985). 
 71. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291. 
 72. Id. at 293 (“[T]he long tradition of amateurism in college sports, by definition, shows that 
student athletes . . . participate in their sports for reasons wholly unrelated to immediate 
compensation.”). 
 73. Id. (“Simply put, student-athletic ‘play’ is not ‘work,’ at least as the term is used in the FLSA.”). 
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In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Hamilton qualified the 
court’s decision by emphasizing the fact that the challengers in that 
case “did not receive athletic scholarships and participated in a 
non-revenue sport.”74 Judge Hamilton further expressed that he was 
“less confident . . . that [the court’s] reasoning should extend to 
students who receive athletic scholarships to participate 
in . . . revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS 
football . . . [because the] economic reality and the tradition of 
amateurism may not point in the same direction.”75 He concluded his 
concurrence by suggesting that there “may be room for further 
debate . . . for cases addressing employment status” under the 
economic reality analysis, immediately sparking subsequent FLSA 
challenges from athletes of revenue-generating sports.76 
2. “Roadmap” to Success: Economic Dependence on 
Scholarships 
Most notably, Lamar Dawson, a former football player at the 
University of Southern California, and Lawrence “Poppy” Livers, a 
former football player at Villanova University, pursued FLSA 
challenges against the NCAA under the guidance of Judge 
Hamilton’s concurring opinion.77 Dawson alleged that he was an 
employee of the Pac-12 and the NCAA under the joint-employer 
doctrine.78 Dawson inexplicably failed to name his own university as 
a defendant in the case, however, leading to the ultimate dismissal of 
 
 74. Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. (observing that these sports generate “billions of dollars of revenue for colleges”). 
 76. Id. See generally Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019); 
Livers II, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2018). It is important to note, however, 
that although Judge Hamilton’s concurrence suggests that there may be merit to the argument of 
whether athletes in revenue-generating sports qualify as employees under the FLSA, his language 
carries only persuasive authority and is not binding upon any court. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 93. 
 77. Dawson, 932 F.3d at 905; Livers II, 2018 WL 3609839, at *1. 
 78. Dawson, 932 F.3d at 908. 
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his claim by the Ninth Circuit.79 Livers, on the other hand, earned a 
monumental victory for college athletes pursuing FLSA challenges 
by surviving the NCAA’s motion to dismiss his amended 
complaint.80 
Initially, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed Livers’s complaint but did so without 
prejudice and with leave to amend after Livers had attempted to 
allege that his academic scholarship from Villanova qualified as a 
form of compensation.81 Though Livers conceded that he was not 
directly compensated in exchange for his athletic services, he alleged 
that his scholarship could be considered “wages in another form.”82 
The court acknowledged that a worker who is not paid directly for his 
services may still qualify as an employee if the worker remains 
personally dependent on any benefits received from the alleged 
employer during the existence of the relationship.83 On first pass, 
however, the court dismissed Livers’s complaint, finding that he had 
not sufficiently alleged reliance to the extent of dependence on any 
benefits received.84 
Livers then amended his complaint, alleging additional facts 
showing that he had relied on the financial benefits of his scholarship 
to the extent of being personally economically dependent upon that 
 
 79. Id. at 913 (“There is no authority that supports an inference that, even though the student-athletes 
are not considered to be employees of their schools under California law, the NCAA and the [Pac]-12 
can nevertheless be held to be ‘joint employers’ with the students’ schools.”). There is no available 
explanation for Dawson’s fatal mistake in omitting the university as a named defendant, though scholars 
have speculated that the reason may be due in part to the University of Southern California’s status as a 
private school. See Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 85–86 n.38. 
 80. Livers II, 2018 WL 3609839, at *6. Livers’s case ultimately ended inconclusively in April of 
2019 when he withdrew from the case for personal reasons. Robert Iafolla, NCAA Hit with Another 
Lawsuit Seeking Pay for Athlete’s Play (3), BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:53 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/ncaa-hit-with-another-lawsuit-seeking-pay-for-
athletes-play [https://perma.cc/RQT8-JQD3]. 
 81. Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (Livers I), No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 2291027, at *1, *16 
(E.D. Pa. May 17, 2018). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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scholarship, and survived the NCAA’s renewed motion to dismiss.85 
Allowing Livers to amend his complaint to allege his economic 
dependence on his scholarship appears to have “provided a clear 
roadmap” for future college athletes challenging the NCAA’s 
compensation restrictions under the FLSA.86 Because the court 
focused on whether Livers was economically dependent on his 
scholarship rather than whether the scholarship could actually be 
considered compensation itself, however, the court applied a holistic 
approach—rather than a multi-factor test, as Livers had urged the 
court to adopt—to evaluate the economic reality of the relationship.87 
An alternative finding that athletes actually are compensated in the 
current landscape could significantly alter this economic reality 
analysis in a beneficial manner for the athletes and future 
challengers.88 
 
 85. Livers II, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 471 
U.S. 290 (1985)). 
 86. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 97–98 (“According to the court, a football student-athlete plaintiff who 
is within the statute of limitations can find success by . . . showing that the student-athlete is 
economically dependent on his or her athletic scholarship.”). On November 6, 2019, Trey Johnson, 
another former Villanova football player, filed a class-action lawsuit in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania arguing that college athletes are employees under the FLSA and thus entitled to minimum 
wage and overtime pay. Billy Witz, N.C.A.A. Is Sued for Not Paying Athletes As Employees, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/sports/ncaa-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/JYG5-
Z4VU]. Johnson, who is represented by the same attorney who represented Livers, sought to classify all 
Division I college athletes—not just those in revenue-generating sports and regardless of whether they 
received a scholarship—as employees under the FLSA. Id. (“This is not about being paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, and we are not limiting this case only to the select few athletes that can receive 
endorsement deals . . . . We are simply asking the N.C.A.A. to pay its student athletes the basic 
minimum wage as required by federal law.” (quoting former Villanova football player Trey Johnson)). 
 87. Livers II, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 n.2; Livers I, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 2291027, at *16 
(declining to apply a multi-factor test because the cases applying such a test dealt with the question of 
whether particular workers who receive monetary compensation for their work qualified as “employees” 
under the FLSA and, here, the appropriate question was whether Livers may properly be considered to 
be a worker who is entitled to compensation at all). 
 88. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 97–98 (suggesting that resolution of antitrust cases allowing grant-in-aid 
scholarships in excess of cost of attendance “could change the calculus on this element”). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
Examining the economic reality of the relationship between 
college athletes, their universities, and the NCAA has proven to be a 
complicated task.89 Because an examination of the economic reality 
requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, courts 
have focused on differing factors.90 The only factor that courts have 
consistently emphasized in the context of college athletics has been 
the “revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”91 To comply 
with this tradition, courts have primarily adopted a holistic approach 
in considering the importance of amateurism.92 Under this approach, 
courts have looked to the Department of Labor (DOL) Field 
Operations Handbook (FOH) as persuasive authority guiding their 
analysis.93 
The FOH provides commentary used to guide DOL staff and 
investigators when interpreting the statutory provisions of the 
 
 89. See Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290–91 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing 
that courts have developed and adopted a myriad of multi-factor tests and differing approaches in 
guiding their analysis of the economic reality of the relationship). 
 90. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that 
an examination of economic reality requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the relationship, including: (1) expectation of compensation; (2) the power to hire and fire; 
and (3) evidence of an agreement “conceived or carried out” to evade the law); Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 
(rejecting a multi-factor test for failing to capture the true nature of the relationship, which is defined by 
the long-standing tradition of amateurism); Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *12 (“In some 
circumstances, the Third Circuit has invoked a multi-factor test to evaluate the ‘economic realities’ of 
employment relationships for the purpose of determining FLSA rights.”). 
 91. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)). The court in Berger ultimately declined to adopt a multi-factor test to 
determine the economic reality of the relationship because the proposed multi-factor test “simply [did] 
not take into account this tradition of amateurism or the reality of the student-athlete experience.” Id. 
(“That long-standing tradition defines the economic reality of the relationship between student athletes 
and their schools.”). 
 92. Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *16 (adopting a holistic approach to evaluate economic reality 
after considering precedent from various FLSA challenges, including previous attempts to qualify 
college athletes as employees). 
 93. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292 (“[T]he provisions in this handbook are not dispositive, but they are 
certainly persuasive.”); Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *16 (“While the DOL’s interpretation in the 
FOH is ‘not controlling’ on this Court, it is ‘persuasive.’”). 
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FLSA.94 Chapter 10 of the FOH contains detailed interpretations of 
the “employment relationship required for the [FLSA] to apply.”95 
Section 10b03(e) lists and describes several “extracurricular 
activities” as voluntary endeavors “conducted primarily for the 
benefit of the participants as a part of the educational opportunities 
provided to the students by the school or institution.”96 According to 
the FOH, such extracurricular activities are “not work of the kind 
contemplated by [the FLSA] and do not result in an employer–
employee relationship between the student and the school.”97 
Section 10b03(e) explicitly characterizes “interscholastic athletics” 
as an extracurricular activity.98 Section 10b24(a) further—and 
perhaps redundantly—emphasizes that any university or college 
students participating in these extracurricular activities “are generally 
not considered to be employees within the meaning of the [FLSA].”99 
As a result, courts have been reluctant to find that college athletes 
perform “work” in exchange for compensation that would entitle 
them to “employee” status under the FLSA.100 Other approaches are 
available, however, and may be more applicable moving forward.101 
Challengers have consistently petitioned courts to adopt a 
multi-factor test to evaluate the economic reality of the relationship, 
 
 94. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB., FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK ch. 10, § 10a00 
(2016) [hereinafter DOL FOH], 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FOH_Ch10.pdf [https://perma.cc/B42W-
UNSC]; see also Berger, 843 F.3d at 292. 
 95. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292 (alteration in original) (citing DOL FOH, supra note 94). 
 96. Id. at 292–93 (citing DOL FOH, supra note 94, § 10b03(e)); Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *14. 
 97. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293 (alteration in original) (citing DOL FOH, supra note 94, § 10b03(e)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (alteration in original) (citing DOL FOH, supra note 94, § 10b24(a)). 
 100. See, e.g., Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *14–16 (finding that college football players do not 
receive compensation in exchange for their participation in college athletics); Colwell, supra note 3, at 
910 (“[A]ccording to the DOL . . . participation [in athletics] does not qualify as sufficient ‘work’ to 
qualify for minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA.”). 
 101. Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *16 (“While much of our analysis has centered around a holistic 
application of the ‘economic reality’ test, . . . this does not foreclose the possibility that an appropriate 
multi-factor test could be identified for evaluating . . . whether a student athlete who receives an Athletic 
Scholarship is an ‘employee’ for FLSA purposes.”). 
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suggesting that such an approach may be more favorable in finding 
that college athletes qualify as employees under the FLSA.102 Though 
numerous multi-factor tests exist, courts have recognized that the 
most applicable may be the six-factor test enumerated in Donovan v. 
DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.103 The Donovan test considers: (1) the 
alleged employer’s right to control how the work is to be performed; 
(2) the alleged employee’s opportunity to experience profit or loss; 
(3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or material 
required for the work; (4) whether the services rendered require 
special skill; (5) the permanence of the working relationship; and (6) 
whether the service rendered is integral to the alleged employer’s 
business.104 Though the DOL has enumerated similar factors in its 
FOH, the Donovan test offers a fairer assessment of the 
circumstances surrounding the relationship without the prejudicial 
influence of the FOH commentary dismissing interscholastic athletics 
as mere extracurricular activities.105 
In Donovan, and in similar cases adopting the six-factor test, the 
court focused on the question of whether a particular worker who 
receives monetary compensation for their work is entitled to FLSA 
protection.106 In contrast, courts evaluating the economic reality of 
the relationship between college athletes, their universities, and the 
NCAA have focused on the more “threshold question” of whether an 
athlete may properly be considered a worker entitled to compensation 
 
 102. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 291; Livers II, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Pa. July 
26, 2018); Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *8. 
 103. 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985); Livers II, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 n.2; Livers I, 2018 WL 
2291027, at *16 (“Any such test would likely lean on the factors outlined by the Third Circuit in 
Donovan, a standard . . . which may offer a useful starting point for developing rules of analysis for the 
threshold question of who is an ‘employee’ at all.”). 
 104. Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *12–13 (citing Donovan, 757 F.2d at 1382). 
 105. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292–93; Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *9; Colwell, supra note 3, at 906–
07; WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FACT SHEET #13: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) [hereinafter DOL FACT SHEET #13], 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5SM-JSDZ] (July 2008). 
 106. Donovan, 757 F.2d at 1376; see also Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., 622 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 
2015); Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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at all.107 Perhaps the only reason courts have refrained from applying 
a multi-factor test is a general reluctance to characterize an athlete’s 
performance as “work” or “labor” and an athletic scholarship as 
“compensation.”108 Following Judge Wilken’s Alston order and the 
Ninth Circuit’s subsequent affirmance of Judge Wilken’s factual 
findings, however, courts now have a basis for overcoming this 
reluctance.109 
A. Examining Judge Wilken’s Order in Alston 
In March of 2019, Judge Wilken of the Northern District of 
California issued an order permanently enjoining the NCAA from 
capping grant-in-aid scholarships and education-related benefits at 
less than the cost of attendance.110 Judge Wilken found that the 
NCAA’s rules limiting compensation that Division I basketball and 
FBS football athletes are permitted to receive in exchange for their 
athletic services violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
under a rule of reason analysis.111 The Ninth Circuit subsequently 
affirmed Judge Wilken’s order in May of 2020 and upheld her 
injunction against the NCAA.112 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed all of Judge Wilken’s factual findings and adopted the 
language Judge Wilken used during her thorough assessment of the 
NCAA’s amateurism principles.113 
 
 107. Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *13. 
 108. Id. at *15 (recognizing that a multi-factor test is “particularly appropriate where . . . it is clear 
that some entity is an ‘employer’ and the question is which one” (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 
806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992))). 
 109. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 110. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1110. 
 111. Id. at 1109. 
 112. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244 (“We conclude that the district court properly applied the Rule of 
Reason in determining that the enjoined rules are unlawful restraints of trade under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.”). 
 113. Id. 
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As the first step in the rule of reason analysis, Judge Wilken chose 
to adopt the market definition previously defined in O’Bannon.114 
There, the court defined the relevant market as one comprising of 
national markets for college athletes’ “labor in the form of athletic 
services” where each athlete participates in their sport-specific 
market.115 In Alston, Judge Wilken further recognized that, in these 
markets, the athletes “sell their athletic services . . . in exchange for 
grants-in-aid and other compensation and benefits permitted by 
NCAA rules.”116 In choosing to use this specific language in defining 
the relevant market, Judge Wilken expressly recognized that college 
athletes perform “labor” in exchange for “compensation,” a stark 
contrast from the reluctancy of the court in Livers to characterize 
such scholarships as compensation.117 Further, Judge Wilken found 
 
 114. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1066; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248 (“As to the merits, [the 
district court] adopted, at the parties’ request, the market definition from O’Bannon I: the market for a 
college education or, alternatively, student-athletes’ labor.”). In O’Bannon, Judge Wilken recognized 
that the NCAA maintained monopsony power in the market of college athletics, characterizing schools 
as buyers and college athletes as sellers in a market for recruits’ athletic services and licensing rights. 
Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067, 1097 (citing O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2014), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)). Importantly, the NCAA did not challenge 
the market definitions on appeal, and the Ninth Circuit adopted those definitions as well. Id. at 1067 
(citing O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015)). The Ninth Circuit further emphasized that, 
due to the absence of any viable substitutes, the NCAA maintains monopsony power in these markets 
because the athletes are unable to obtain the same combination of college education, high-level 
television exposure, and opportunities to enter professional sports that are provided by Division I 
programs. Id. at 1067, 1097. 
 115. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (emphasis added); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248. In both 
O’Bannon and Alston, the courts limited the market definition to the specific markets of Division I 
basketball and FBS football as the primary revenue-generating sports. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097. 
 116. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (emphasis added); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248 (“To 
begin, the district court accepted Student-Athletes’ trial theory narrowing the relevant market to one in 
which Student-Athletes sell their ‘labor in the form of athletic services’ to schools in exchange for 
athletic scholarships and other payments permitted by the NCAA.” (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1067, 1097)). 
 117. Compare Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (finding that college athletes “sell their athletic 
services to the schools that participate in Division I basketball and FBS football in exchange for 
grants-in-aid and other benefits and compensation permitted by NCAA rules”), with Livers I, No. 
17-4271, 2018 WL 2291027, at *1, *16 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff athlete failed 
to sufficiently allege facts establishing that a full academic scholarship constituted “wages [received] in 
another form” in exchange for “his agreement to participate as a member of the Villanova football 
team”). 
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that the challenged compensation regulations harmed the athletes 
directly by depriving them of compensation they would receive in the 
absence of such restraints.118 Once the relevant market was defined, 
Judge Wilken quickly concluded that the challenged regulations 
resulted in anticompetitive effects due to the NCAA’s near complete 
dominance of, and exercise of monopsony power within, the 
market.119 
The NCAA offered two procompetitive justifications for the 
challenged rules regulating compensation for athletes.120 
Unsurprisingly, the NCAA relied most heavily on the 
“long[-]standing principle of amateurism,” arguing that consumer 
demand would evaporate instantaneously if the athletes were allowed 
to be compensated for their services.121 Judge Wilken balked at this 
 
 118. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070, 1098; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1270 (Smith, J., 
concurring) (“Here, Student-Athletes are quite clearly deprived of the fair value of their services.”). 
 119. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097–98 (finding sufficient evidence to show that the compensation 
regulations amount to horizontal price-fixing among competitors by essentially eliminating price 
competition as to the recruitment of college athletes, resulting in harm to the athletes by depriving them 
of compensation they would receive in the absence of such restraints); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 
1256–57 (“The district court found that the NCAA’s rules have ‘significant anticompetitive effects in 
the relevant market’ for Student-Athletes’ labor on the gridiron and the court. These findings ‘have 
substantial support in the record,’ and the NCAA does not dispute them.” (first quoting Alston I, 375 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1070; and then quoting O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1070) (citations omitted)). Unlike a 
monopoly, which exists when sellers in a market collude or exercise dominant power within that 
market, a monopsony exists when buyers collude or exercise dominant power within a market. 
O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 991. The Supreme Court has noted that “similar legal standards should 
apply to claims of monopolization and to claims of monopsonization.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 322 (2007). As in O’Bannon, Judge Wilken 
analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims in Alston “[u]nder the theory of monopsony, sometimes referred to as a 
buyers’ cartel, [where] schools were characterized as buyers and student-athletes as sellers in a market 
for recruits’ athletic services and licensing rights.” Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (citing O’Bannon I, 
7 F. Supp. 3d at 991).  
 120. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1098. On appeal, the NCAA relied on only one procompetitive 
justification—the principle of amateurism—choosing not to assert the “wedge” theory as a justification 
as it had at the district court level. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257 (“On appeal, the NCAA advances a single 
procompetitive justification: The challenged rules preserve ‘amateurism,’ which, in turn, ‘widen[s] 
consumer choice’ by maintaining a distinction between college and professional sports.” (alteration in 
original)). 
 121. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1098; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258; Colwell, supra note 3, at 
932–33 (“The long[-]standing principle of amateurism, which requires that student-athletes may not 
receive any type of compensation and will be deemed ineligible to play if they violate this rule, supports 
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assertion, finding that the NCAA failed to offer any evidence 
establishing that the challenged compensation rules, as stated, were 
directly connected with consumer demand.122 
In coming to this conclusion, Judge Wilken first attempted to 
identify a clear definition of amateurism.123 Alarmingly, Judge 
Wilken was unable to locate anything even attempting to define the 
supposed “bedrock” principle of college athletics.124 The NCAA, as 
it had in each preceding instance, insisted that the principle of 
amateurism relies on the notion that college athletes should not be 
paid for their participation in their respective sports; i.e., “pay for 
play” is not consistent with the principle of amateurism.125 
Shockingly, however, the NCAA Constitution does not mention 
compensation nor payment when describing the principle of 
 
the NCAA’s stance that student-athletes are not employees.”). The NCAA argued that the principle of 
amateurism drives consumer demand on its own and that the regulations regarding compensation are 
procompetitive because they “implement” or “effectuate” that principle. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1070 (“The corollary is that if consumers did not believe that student-athletes were amateurs, they 
would watch fewer games and revenues would decrease as a result.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 
1258 (“[T]he NCAA accuses the district court of straying from a purported ‘judicial consensus’ that the 
NCAA expands consumer choice by enforcing an amateurism principle under which student-athletes 
‘must not be paid’ a penny over the [cost of attendance].”). 
 122. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (“No connection between the ‘Principle of Amateurism’ and 
the challenged compensation limits is evident.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258 (“NCAA witnesses 
confirmed that the NCAA set[s] limits on education-related benefits without consulting any [consumer] 
demand studies.”). 
 123. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258. 
 124. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (“Defendants nowhere define the nature of the amateurism they 
claim consumers insist upon. Defendants offer no stand-alone definition of amateurism either in the 
NCAA rules or in argument.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1259. The NCAA’s Division I Bylaws 
provide a circular definition of “amateurism,” by using the word “amateurs” to then attempt to describe 
the principle itself. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070. Additionally, Judge Wilken acknowledged that the 
NCAA did not actually have rulemaking or enforcement authority over its members until the 1950s, thus 
refuting the claim that amateurism represents a concept entrenched at the foundation of college athletics. 
Id. at 1075. 
 125. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1071; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1249 (observing that “the 
NCAA defined amateurism during the litigation as ‘“not paying” the participants’” (quoting Alston I, 
375 F. Supp. 3d at 1071)). 
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amateurism.126 Nor do the NCAA Constitution or Division I Bylaws 
even mention “pay for play,” let alone define the phrase.127 
The NCAA vehemently argued that allowing a “pay for play” 
system would be inherently inconsistent with the essential qualities 
of amateurism and would negatively affect consumer demand.128 
Judge Wilken recognized, however, that reality paints a different 
picture: athletes currently receive numerous forms of compensation 
that appear to violate the regulations—and thus amateurism—at first 
glance.129 This is possible because the NCAA compensation 
regulations do not actually follow a coherent definition of 
“amateurism” because no such definition exists.130 Because no 
 
 126. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1259. 
 127. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1071; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1249 (observing that the 
“purported pay-for-play prohibition is riddled with exceptions”). The term “pay” is only defined by 
listing a variety of forms of compensation that are prohibited by the NCAA rules unless the form of 
compensation falls under an exception in a subsequent provision. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 
(“Thus, whether any form of compensation constitutes ‘pay’ in violation of NCAA rules cannot be 
determined except by studying all of the relevant bylaws and all of their exceptions and 
cross-references.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244 (“‘[P]ay’ is defined as the ‘receipt of funds, 
awards or benefits not permitted by governing legislation.’” (alteration in original)); NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL, supra note 1, at arts. 12.1.2.1, 15.01.1. 
 128. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1098; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1249, 1258. 
 129. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1071–72 (“[A] review of the bylaws shows that many forms of 
payment, often in unrestricted cash, from schools and other sources, are allowed by the NCAA as ‘not 
pay,’ and thus as not inconsistent with amateurism.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244 (“[G]overning 
legislation permits a wide range of above-[cost-of-attendance] payments—both related and unrelated to 
education.”). Judge Wilken’s review of the NCAA’s Division I Bylaws found that athletes currently 
receive compensation in the following forms: (1) cost-of-attendance grants-in-aid that, if in an amount 
exceeding the cost of fixed expenses (tuition, room, board, books, etc.), are often provided in cash; (2) 
athletics participation and performance awards not related to education (often provided in the form Visa 
gift cards that can be used like cash); (3) monies provided by the NCAA each year through the Student 
Assistance Fund (SAF) and the Academic Enhancement Fund (AEF); and (4) payments from outside 
entities for winnings earned from outside competition such as in the Olympics. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1064, 1072–74; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244–45. These forms of compensation, some of 
which are unrelated to education and may be provided in cash or a cash-equivalent, can add up to 
several thousand dollars yet are not considered “pay” according to the Bylaws. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1072, 1074; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1261 (“When asked about the propriety of 
above-[cost-of-attendance] compensation, the current [Mid-American Conference] commissioner 
similarly testified that the ‘key’ is ‘linking’ payments to the ‘pursuit of the educational opportunities of 
the individual involved.’”). 
 130. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070, 1074 (“The only common thread underlying all forms and 
amounts of currently permissible compensation is that the NCAA has decided to allow [that form].”); 
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concrete definition exists, the application and enforcement of the 
amateurism principles have varied significantly throughout the 
history of college athletics.131 
Not only has the world continued to turn while athletes have 
received various forms of compensation, but consumer demand has 
remained as strong as ever.132 In fact, revenue generated from 
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football has increased since 
2015 (when the Power Five conferences voted to increase 
grant-in-aid scholarship amounts), suggesting that consumer demand 
has actually increased as well.133 Faced with factual findings directly 
contradicting the NCAA’s assertions, the governing body was unable 
 
see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1259. 
 131. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1075 n.18 (“[T]he fact that the NCAA currently permits 
student-athletes to receive . . . forms of compensation . . . in addition to a full grant-in-aid scholarship, 
such as compensation ‘incidental to athletics participation,’ . . . distinguishes today’s concept of 
[amateurism] from that in effect in earlier years.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1255 (recognizing that 
the compensation landscape has “meaningfully changed since O’Bannon” because athletes have 
received awards and permissible forms of compensation in the thousands of dollars to pay for personal 
expenses unrelated to education). 
 132. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1074–75, 1100; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258–59 (“[T]he 
court reasonably declined to adopt the Not One Penny standard based on considerable evidence that 
college sports have retained their distinctive popularity despite an increase in permissible forms of 
above-[cost-of-attendance] compensation and benefits.”). Judge Wilken recognized that Dr. Daniel 
Rascher, the plaintiffs’ expert witness, provided “[t]he only economic analysis in the record that 
specifically [spoke] to the effects of compensation amounts on consumer demand.” Alston I, 375 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1076. Dr. Rascher’s economic analysis focused on a comparison of consumer demand 
before and after the Power Five conferences voted to independently increase the limit of grant-in-aid 
scholarships to the cost-of-attendance in 2015. Id. at 1076–78; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258. Dr. 
Rascher ultimately concluded that increased college-athlete compensation does not negatively affect 
consumer demand of Division I basketball and FBS football. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1076; see also 
Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258 (“Dr. Rascher’s . . . demand analyses demonstrate that the NCAA has 
loosened its restrictions on above-[cost-of-attendance], education-related benefits since O’Bannon 
without adversely affecting consumer demand.”). 
 133. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1076 (accepting Dr. Rascher’s economic findings that revenues 
generated from Division I basketball and FBS football have increased since 2015); see also Alston II, 
958 F.3d at 1245, 1250, 1262 (“The district court had before it (and fairly credited) evidence that 
demand would withstand even higher caps on such awards and incentives.”). Revenue generation is 
regarded as “one of the best economic measures of consumer demand.” Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1077; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1250 (“In fact, Dr. Rascher found that revenues from [Division I] 
basketball and FBS football, ‘one of the best economic measures of consumer demand,’ have increased 
since 2015.” (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1077)). 
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to present any evidence showing that its Division I Bylaws limiting 
compensation were enacted based on an analysis of consumer 
demand.134 To the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly suggested 
that the limits were arbitrarily enacted.135 Such a finding undermined 
the NCAA’s argument that the challenged compensation restrictions 
were necessary to preserve consumer demand.136 
Likewise, Judge Wilken was not persuaded by the NCAA’s second 
asserted justification that the challenged rules promote integration 
within the school community and improve the athletes’ academic 
experience.137 Not only do the NCAA’s limits on compensation lack 
a causal connection to positive student experience, but the NCAA’s 
own experts even conceded that additional compensation could 
improve student-related outcomes for the athletes.138 The NCAA 
relied on a “wedge” theory that the Ninth Circuit previously accepted 
in O’Bannon, arguing that compensation limits help prevent a 
“wedge” between the athletes and other students that could form if 
the athletes received compensation not available to the other 
students.139 Judge Wilken recognized, however, that the present 
circumstances differed substantially from those in O’Bannon in light 
 
 134. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1080; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258. 
 135. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1102; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258. 
 136. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1074; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258 (“The record in this 
case . . . reflects no such procompetitive effect of limiting non-cash, education-related benefits.”). 
 137. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 (“While the evidence shows that student-athletes benefit from 
receiving a college education, it does not support the notion that . . . such benefits arise out of, or are 
caused by, the . . . compensation limits.”). The NCAA did not raise this “wedge” theory justification on 
appeal, choosing only to rely upon the amateurism justification. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1249 n.8. 
 138. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1084, 1103. Such a concession belies the notion that limits on 
compensation are necessary to achieve positive outcomes for college athletes. Id. at 1074. Judge Wilken 
was persuaded by the fact that most of the education-related benefits college athletes receive are caused 
by the education itself and the policies surrounding that education. Id. at 1102–03 (“[S]tudent-athletes 
would still enjoy the benefits caused by the latter rules and policies even if the challenged compensation 
limits were changed.”). 
 139. Id. at 1084, 1103. NCAA witness Dr. James Heckman opined that athletic achievement 
incentives would “isolate student-athletes ‘from the rest of the student body’ and affect the ‘camaraderie 
in these various institutions.’” Id. at 1084. 
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of the finding that college athletes have actually received increasing 
amounts of compensation since 2015.140 
Yet again, the NCAA was unable to produce any additional 
evidence to support its position—this time failing to show that the 
increase in compensation had actually created a “wedge.”141 Instead, 
Judge Wilken concluded that compensation limits may actually serve 
to increase the separation among students, not decrease or prevent a 
“wedge” from occurring.142 Judge Wilken recognized that the 
compensation regulations often divert funds that would otherwise go 
to the athletes directly elsewhere into investments like “extravagant, 
athletes-only facilities.”143 Schools often end up spending excess 
revenue on recruitment resources that exclusively benefit athletes.144 
Additionally, the compensation limits may constrain the athletes’ 
financial abilities to engage in social activities with other students, 
further separating the athletes from the general school population.145 
Ultimately, however, Judge Wilken did recognize—albeit 
reluctantly—a lone credible procompetitive effect of amateurism in 
preventing “unlimited, professional-level cash payments . . . that 
could blur the distinction between college sports and professional 
sports.”146 Importantly, Judge Wilken emphasized that such a 
 
 140. Id. at 1085, 1103. 
 141. Id. at 1085, 1103. Judge Wilken observed that economic and income-related disparities are 
inevitable, regardless of the context, due to family background and various sources of wealth. Id. at 
1084. 
 142. Id. at 1085, 1103 (“[T]he [compensation limits] may create or exacerbate a wedge . . . .”). 
 143. Id. at 1103. 
 144. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1085. 
 145. Id. at 1086, 1103. 
 146. Id. at 1082, 1103–04 (“The Court does credit the importance to consumer demand of maintaining 
a distinction between college sports and professional sports.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1260 (“In 
short, the district court fairly found that NCAA compensation limits preserve demand to the extent they 
prevent unlimited cash payments akin to professional salaries, but not insofar as they restrict certain 
education-related benefits.”). Judge Wilken conceded that precedent weighs in favor of allowing the 
NCAA “ample latitude” to “superintend college athletics” so that the court “may not ‘use antitrust law 
to make marginal adjustments to broadly reasonable market restraints.’” Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1104 (quoting O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d. 1049, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2015)). Judge Wilken emphasized, 
however, that the distinction between college and professional sports “cannot be based on 
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distinction lies in maintaining an educational connection to the 
permissible compensation while preventing “unlimited cash 
payments [to college athletes] similar to those observed in 
professional sports.”147 After considering three alternatives proposed 
by the athlete challengers, Judge Wilken imposed a slightly modified 
but less restrictive alternative, preventing the NCAA from limiting 
education-related compensation and benefits at less than the cost of 
attendance, but did so without opening the door for potentially 
unlimited, non-education-related cash payments.148 
Although experts initially speculated that Judge Wilken’s ruling 
left a relatively muted impact on the NCAA’s compensation 
regulations, the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent affirmance added more 
 
student-athletes not receiving any compensation . . . because [they] currently can receive thousands or 
tens of thousands of dollars in such compensation, related and unrelated to education, while remaining 
NCAA amateurs.” Id. at 1082. Rather, Judge Wilken specifically narrowed the distinction between 
college and professional sports to the fact that “student-athletes do not receive unlimited payments 
unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports leagues.” Id. at 1083 (emphasis 
added); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258 (“Instead, the record supports a much narrower conception 
of amateurism that still gives rise to procompetitive effects: Not paying student-athletes ‘unlimited 
payments unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports leagues’ is what makes 
them ‘amateurs.’” (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1083)). 
 147. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082–83 (finding that rules limiting or prohibiting non-cash-related 
benefits do not foster consumer demand by maintaining a distinction between college and professional 
sports, but rules limiting cash or cash-equivalent benefits untethered to education do have 
procompetitive effects to the extent they prevent unlimited cash payments akin to those in professional 
sports); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258. Judge Wilken did find, however, that recent increases in 
compensation that were even unrelated to education had not decreased consumer demand for Division I 
basketball or FBS football. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1089; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1265 (“The 
record indicates that the Power Five schools have exercised their autonomy in recent years to expand 
benefits unrelated to education and that conferences and schools have provided largely discretionary 
SAF and AEF payments for a wide range of expenses unrelated to education—both without harming 
consumer demand.”). 
 148. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1087, 1105 (finding that the alternative “would be virtually as 
effective as the challenged set of rules in preserving the same contribution to consumer demand for 
Division I basketball and FBS football” because it “expands education-related compensation and 
benefits only, and it does so in a way that would not result in unlimited cash payments, untethered to 
education, similar to those observed in professional sports”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1263 (“In 
our view, the district court struck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents 
anticompetitive harm to Student-Athletes while serving the procompetitive purpose of preserving the 
popularity of college sports. Thus, we neither vacate nor broaden the injunction, but affirm.”). 
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weight to the ruling and its potential long-term implications.149 
Luckily, the judiciary has gained assistance in the fight against the 
NCAA’s amateurism principles in the form of mounting legislative 
and societal pressure.150 Sensing the foundation of amateurism 
shaking beneath it, the NCAA has lobbied Congress to step in and 
save the governing body—though a swift salvation seems unlikely.151 
 
 149. Hobson, supra note 60; see also Berkowitz, Judge’s Ruling Stands, supra note 16 (recognizing 
that the Ninth Circuit’s holding “opens the door for more challenges” in the future against the NCAA’s 
compensation regulations); Associated Press, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear NCAA Athlete 
Compensation Case, ESPN (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/30530625/supreme-court-agrees-hear-ncaa-athlete-compensation-case 
[https://perma.cc/E5TJ-XM6E] (“This case, and I don’t think it’s overstating it, . . . could fundamentally 
change the structure of college sports and the relationship between college athletes and their schools and 
conferences . . . . It could . . . ultimately allow schools to pay anything they want to try to attract the 
athlete.” (quoting Tulane Sports Law Program Director Gabe Feldman)). Despite experts’ initial 
skepticism about how profound an impact the ruling could have on the college sports world, the NCAA 
understood that such a ruling could threaten the organization’s very existence, explicitly acknowledging 
as much in its petition to the Supreme Court. Amy Howe, Court to Take On Student-Athlete 
Compensation, Class Action Cases, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 16, 2020, 1:32 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/court-to-take-on-student-athlete-compensation-class-action-cases/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z3UZ-SMTB] (“The NCAA told the justices that, if allowed to stand, the 9th Circuit’s 
ruling ‘will fundamentally transform the century-old institution of NCAA sports, blurring the traditional 
line between college and professional athletes.’”). Now, with the Supreme Court set to formally review 
the case in 2021 and evaluate the NCAA’s amateurism principles for the first time in over thirty-five 
years, there can be no doubt about, or denial of, the significance of Judge Wilken’s ruling and the Ninth 
Circuit’s subsequent affirmance. Id. 
 150. Thomas Baker, 5 Issues to Keep an Eye On with the NCAA’s New NIL Policy, FORBES (Nov. 1, 
2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2019/11/01/examining-the-ncaas-
evolving-nil-policy-keep-an-eye-on-the-following-issues/#3e2655577591 [https://perma.cc/54LU-
CV49] (“[W]e should not ignore the legal pressure asserted on the NCAA that forced its change in 
position.”); Michael Cunningham, Time for Power 5 Football Bubble and Further Break from NCAA, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/sports/mike-check-blog/time-for-power-5-
football-bubble-further-break-from-ncaa/IGOSMFJAZJFMBKD34MNT6NMGC4/ 
[https://perma.cc/C7BU-UPJN] (“Social and political changes are putting pressure on college sports.”); 
Dan Murphy, Florida Name, Image, Likeness Bill Now a Law; State Athletes Can Profit from 
Endorsements Next Summer, ESPN (June 12, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-name-image-likeness-bill-now-law-meaning-state-athletes-profit-
endorsements-next-summer [https://perma.cc/FT4K-DEAJ] (“Now that Florida’s law is 
official, . . . Congress has less than [thirteen] months to pass federal legislation if it is going to preempt 
state law.”); Blinder & Witz, supra note 9. 
 151. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14; Berkowitz, Colorado NIL Law, supra 
note 10; Zagger, supra note 10 (recognizing that the NCAA has asked Congress to not only pass federal 
legislation preempting state NIL laws but to also afford the governing body antitrust exemption); see 
also George F. Will, The NCAA’s Shameless Excuses for Denying ‘Student-Athletes’ the Money They 
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Tension remains at an all-time high in the meantime, as the NCAA’s 
amateurism principles—and the NCAA’s overall existence—reach 
previously unimaginable levels of volatility.152 The driving factor 
underlying this tension is the national recognition that college 
athletes have been consistently exploited by the NCAA and remain 
victims of economic inequality.153 Athletes have seized the 
opportunity in these tumultuous times, presenting a unified front 
advocating for the economic protections they deserve—and indeed, 
are entitled to.154 These “once-in-a-lifetime circumstances” make the 
 
Earn, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-ncaa-is-a-
cafeteria-of-embarrassments/2019/11/15/668e2c80-071b-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/C9KQ-DB2T] (“[The California Fair Pay to Play Act and similar proposed legislation 
represent] a small but widening fissure in the NCAA’s crumbling wall of resistance to allowing athletes 
to be among those who profit from their talents.”). Congress may not come to the NCAA’s rescue as 
quickly as the governing body may like, however. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 
14 (hypothesizing that the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 presidential election could inhibit 
Congress’s ability to quickly pass legislation). Though, as discussed supra note 17, Congress has 
introduced bipartisan legislation, the proposed bill “stops short of implementing all of the restrictions 
that the NCAA and other college sports administrators have asked Congress to help them impose.” 
Murphy, Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill, supra note 17. But see Dellenger, Congress Introduces NIL Bill, 
supra note 17 (discussing proposed federal legislation that would provide antitrust protections for the 
NCAA and “prohibit schools from classifying athletes as employees”). The NCAA’s plea to Congress 
could blow up in its face as legislators have also introduced a “College Athletes Bill of Rights,” 
discussed supra note 17, which would provide athletes even more protections than the recently enacted 
state legislation. Berkowitz, Democrats Introduce College Athletes Bill of Rights, supra note 22. For a 
detailed overview of the varying forms of proposed federal legislation, including the College Athletes 
Bill of Rights, the College Athlete and Compensation Rights Act (which would provide antitrust 
protection for the NCAA and establish that college athletes cannot be classified as employees), the 
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, and the Fairness in College Athletics Act, see Murphy, 
Congressional NIL Options, supra note 7. 
 152. Pearl, supra note 9; Blinder & Witz, supra note 9; Gordon, supra note 18; Zagger, supra note 10 
(“[E]xplicitly allowing athletes to be paid for their NIL—even if it is only from third parties—could 
undercut the organization’s primary defense in antitrust suits: that not paying college athletes is key to 
what makes college sports so popular.”). 
 153. Zagger, supra note 10 (“The momentum in state legislatures is being driven by . . . the idea that 
college athletes are being exploited and should be able to earn money, at least from third-party sponsors, 
[which] has gained traction among politicians on both sides of the aisle in recent years.”). 
 154. Dan Wolken, Opinion: As College Football Plans Are Discussed, It’s Time for Athletes to Have 
a Say, USA TODAY (May 19, 2020, 12:34 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/columnist/dan-wolken/2020/05/19/college-football-now-
time-athletes-form-union/5219557002/ [https://perma.cc/F4BP-6P4V] (“There’s never been a more 
opportune time in the history of the NCAA for athletes to form a union and wield real power to 
negotiate their compensation, their working conditions and their rights.”); Gordon, supra note 18 (“That 
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landscape of college athletics ripe for seismic change, and a judicial 
finding that supports the athletes’ need for economic equality and 
protection threatens to topple the entire structure.155 As a result, 
Judge Wilken’s language in Alston regarding the reality of college 
athlete compensation—that the athletes are indeed compensated in 
exchange for their services but deprived of their fair value—could act 
as the final nail in the coffin for the NCAA’s amateurism principles 
in legal contexts outside the realm of antitrust law.156 
B. The Alston Effect on Future FLSA Challenges: Applying the 
Donovan Test 
Judge Wilken’s explicit recognition that college athletes are 
directly compensated in exchange for their athletic services changes 
the entire evaluation of the economic reality of the relationship 
between the athletes, their universities, and the NCAA in the FLSA 
context.157 As a result, the relevant question no longer focuses on 
whether an athlete is deserving of any compensation in the first place 
as it did in Livers.158 Rather, the scenario is now more analogous to 
that in Donovan and cases of the same progeny: the question 
becomes whether a particular worker who receives monetary 
compensation in exchange for their services is in fact an “employee” 
 
chronic, underlying financial inequality is the largest driver of the player protest movement, although 
the movement has gained added resonance due to racial and health concerns.” (quoting Pat Forde of 
Sports Illustrated)); Silva et al., supra note 22 (“[T]housands of athletes across the country are 
demanding the basic rights long denied them.”). 
 155. Gordon, supra note 18; Cunningham, supra note 150 (“I’m hoping that every Power 5 school 
that scuttles in-person classes keeps the athletes working. Keep the players around even if other students 
go home. If that happens then it’s possible a court of law might one day rule, finally, that college players 
are employees. That’s the quickest way to dismantle a system that enriches coaches and administrators 
while schools can collude to deny athletes basic economic rights.”); Wolken, supra note 154. 
 156. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring) (“Student-Athletes are quite 
clearly deprived of the fair value of their services.”); Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 98–99. 
 157. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244, 1248; Ehrlich, supra note 
9, at 97–98. 
 158. Livers I, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 2291027, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2018). 
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entitled to FLSA coverage or if the worker is simply an independent 
contractor operating on their own accord.159 As a result, the stage is 
set for courts to finally adopt the multi-factor Donovan test that 
athlete challengers have urged the courts to adopt.160 Translating 
Judge Wilken’s language into the FLSA context, while considering 
the rapidly changing landscape of modern college athletics, demands 
a finding that the NCAA’s amateurism principles can no longer 
preclude classifying college athletes as employees entitled to FLSA 
coverage.161 
 
 159. Id. (“As in Donovan, the cases that have followed it in applying the multi-factor test have dealt 
with the question of whether particular workers who receive monetary compensation for their 
work . . . are in fact ‘employees’ entitled to FLSA coverage.”). See generally Donovan v. DialAmerica 
Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying a multi-factor test to determine whether a worker 
who receives monetary compensation in exchange for their services qualifies as an employee entitled to 
FLSA coverage or an independent contractor); Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., 622 F. App’x 149 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (same); Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1991) (same). 
 160. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 2019) (“These factors 
[considered in a multi-factor test] prove ‘particularly appropriate where . . . it is clear that some entity is 
an “employer” and the question is which one.’” (quoting Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 
1993))); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that a multi-factor test is 
appropriate “where . . . it is clear that some entity is an employer and the question is which one”); see 
also Livers II, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Penn. July 26, 2018) (“Plaintiff urges 
this Court to import [a multi-factor] test . . . to evaluate whether NCAA Scholarship Athletes are FLSA 
employees . . . .”). The Donovan test also remains consistent with previous courts’ reliance on the DOL 
guiding factors enumerated in the FOH for determining whether an employer–employee relationship 
exists because the Donovan test essentially codifies those factors. Compare Donovan, 757 F.2d at 1382 
(enumerating six factors for consideration to determine whether a worker qualifies as an employee under 
the FLSA), with Colwell, supra note 3, at 906–07 (listing the six factors enumerated by the DOL for 
consideration “to determine the ‘economic reality’ of the employment relationship”), and DOL FACT 
SHEET #13, supra note 105 (same). 
 161. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 99; Joseph M. Hanna, One More Time: New Lawsuit Argues NCAA 
Must Pay Athletes Minimum Wage, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=87b9e8e8-987f-419b-a65e-912bf56f69e6 
[https://perma.cc/6YCX-WP7J] (providing an overview of former Villanova football player Trey 
Johnson’s 2019 lawsuit against the NCAA arguing that college athletes qualify as employees entitled to 
FLSA protections due to the “rapidly changing” landscape of college athletics, discussed supra note 86); 
Cunningham, supra note 150; Rohan Nadkarni, College Football Players Need a Union Now More 
Than Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 2, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/07/02/college-
football-needs-a-union-now-more-than-ever [https://perma.cc/5FNR-WFF9] (“Even in failure, [former 
Northwestern University quarterback Kain] Colter’s union push did lay the groundwork for what to 
expect from a future attempt. Players will almost certainly have to combat a union-busting 
campaign. . . . But it also set a precedent, that college athletes could be considered employees.”). 
Though Judge Wilken’s district court order may only represent persuasive authority for future 
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1. Degree of the NCAA’s Right to Control the College Athletes 
Although college athletes engage in their respective sports 
voluntarily, they remain subject to the almost dictatorial control of 
the NCAA, their universities, and their coaches.162 Typically, 
employers exercise control over their employees by setting the 
schedule of when, and defining the parameters in which, the 
employees will perform their work.163 Independent contractors on the 
other hand generally operate under their own conditions, free of 
employer control.164 Because the NCAA represents the only viable 
option for athletes pursuing professional opportunities, the governing 
body operates as a monopsony, unilaterally regulating college 
athletics.165 Even on a more “day-to-day” level, coaches, universities, 
and the NCAA maintain a considerable amount of control over the 
athletes.166 Not only do the universities and the coaches control the 
 
challengers, the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed Judge Wilken’s factual findings and adopted the 
language employed in the order, adding weight to its persuasive value. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244. Now 
that the Supreme Court is set to review the case, Judge Wilken’s findings and revelations could 
ultimately become binding precedent upon all courts, further eroding the narrowing foundation beneath 
the NCAA’s antiquated amateurism principles. See Howe, supra note 149. 
 162. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Student 
participation in collegiate athletics is entirely voluntary.”); Livers II, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5; Colwell, 
supra note 3, at 930. 
 163. Colwell, supra note 3, at 929 (citing Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1441 
(10th Cir. 1998)). 
 164. Id. (“An independent contractor, in contrast, typically works relatively free of employer control.” 
(citing DOL FACT SHEET #13, supra note 105)). 
 165. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[B]ecause elite student-athletes lack any 
viable alternatives . . . they are forced to accept . . . whatever compensation is offered to them by 
Division I schools, regardless of whether any such compensation is an accurate reflection of the 
competitive value of their athletic services.”), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Alston II, 
958 F.3d at 1256–57 (affirming the district court’s finding that the NCAA rules have significant 
anticompetitive effects in the market for college athletes’ labor because the athletes lack viable 
alternatives). For a discussion on the NCAA’s monopsony status, see supra note 119. 
 166. Colwell, supra note 3, at 930 (“Because of the nature of collegiate athletics, college coaches 
have a considerable amount of control over student-athletes. . . . Coaches dictate student-athletes’ 
day-to-day activities . . . and determine what needs to be accomplished for the student-athlete to 
participate in his sport.”); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring) (“Nevertheless, 
their coaches and others in the Division I ecosystem make sure that Student-Athletes put athletics first, 
which makes it difficult for them to compete for academic success with students more focused on 
academics.”). 
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scheduling of athletic practices, workouts, and competitions, but they 
essentially control the academic schedules of the athletes as well.167 
When push comes to shove in the balance of academics and athletics, 
athletes are frequently forced to put their books down.168 
Courts have already recognized that athletes are personally 
dependent upon their respective universities while in school, leaving 
them vulnerable to any rules or demands imposed upon them.169 
Taking advantage of this dependence, the NCAA requires that all 
member institutions comply with its Division I Bylaws.170 Should 
any athlete violate any provision of the Bylaws, the NCAA 
commands that the athlete’s university suspend or even ultimately 
disqualify the violator.171 Because the athletes are under the complete 
control of the NCAA and their respective universities, this factor 
weighs in favor of classifying the athletes as employees under the 
FLSA.172 
 
 167. Patrick Hruby, The NCAA Says Paying Athletes Hurts Their Education. That’s Laughable., 
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2018, 1:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-ncaa-says-
paying-athletes-hurts-their-education-thats-laughable/2018/09/20/147f26c0-bb80-11e8-a8aa-
860695e7f3fc_story.html [https://perma.cc/QNT4-KMH2] (discussing that former Northwestern 
University quarterback Kain Coulter testified during the Northwestern football team’s petition of the 
National Labor Relations Board “that he was steered away from strenuous classes like chemistry and 
had to abandon a pre-med major because his sport was too time consuming”); see also Alston II, 958 
F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 168. Hruby, supra note 167 (“You can’t ever reach your academic potential with the time 
demands . . . . You have to sacrifice, and we’re not allowed to sacrifice football.” (quoting former 
Northwestern University quarterback Kain Colter)); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., 
concurring) (“They are often forced to miss class, to neglect their studies, and to forego courses whose 
schedules conflict with the sports in which they participate.”). 
 169. Livers II, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2018). 
 170. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 2.1. 
 171. Id. at art. 12.11.1 (“If a student-athlete is ineligible under the provisions of the constitution, 
bylaws or other regulations of the [NCAA], the institution shall be obligated to apply immediately the 
applicable rule and to withhold the student-athlete from all intercollegiate competition.”). 
 172. Colwell, supra note 3, at 929 (citing DOL FACT SHEET #13, supra note 105). 
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2. Opportunities for College Athletes to Experience Profit or Loss 
Because college athletes remain subject to the control of their 
universities and the NCAA, they lack managerial influence when it 
comes to making critical decisions affecting the operation of their 
athletic departments.173 According to FLSA case law, workers who 
maintain managerial influence over the work they perform typically 
fall into the category of independent contractors rather than 
employees.174 When workers are able to exercise their managerial 
influence in a way that improves the efficiency in which they 
perform their work such that they can complete more work, workers 
can experience the profits and losses generated by their work.175 A 
worker who does not share the opportunity to experience profits or 
losses and remains subject to the unilateral decisions of superiors is 
more likely classified as an employee rather than an independent 
contractor.176 
Because college athletes are denied managerial influence, their 
interests often go unaccounted for, especially when it comes to 
matters regarding compensation.177 As a result, the NCAA 
intentionally deprives the athletes of the opportunity to experience 
the value created by their athletic performance, making the athletes 
economically dependent on the scholarships and permissible funds 
provided by their universities.178 Economic dependence is indicative 
 
 173. Id. at 928 (“Student-athletes do not make critical business decisions for a university athletic 
department and do not exercise any managerial control as employees of the university.”). 
 174. Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., 915 F.3d 1050, 1059 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Keller v. Miri 
Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 813 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 808–10 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that a worker who has “no control 
over the essential determinants of profits in a business, and no direct share in the success of the 
business” has not undertaken the typical risks of an independent contractor and is more likely entitled to 
employee status under the FLSA); see also Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1387 
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the opportunity to experience profits and losses is more indicative of an 
independent contractor relationship rather than an employer–employee relationship). 
 177. See Dole, 875 F.2d at 808–10. 
 178. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1068, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 
2020); Alexia Fernández Campbell, Free Labor from College Athletes May Soon Come to an End, VOX 
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of an employer–employee relationship entitled to FLSA protection.179 
Thanks to Livers—and as common sense dictates180—courts already 
acknowledge that college athletes are indeed economically dependent 
on the NCAA and their respective universities.181 
Moreover, Judge Wilken’s analysis shows that although college 
athletes undeniably do not earn their fair share of compensation 
under the existing structure, they do actually receive some forms of 
compensation—albeit those arbitrarily labeled “permissible” 
according to the NCAA.182 Not only are college athletes compensated 
in the form of their grant-in-aid scholarships, but the NCAA also 
disburses money to the athletes annually through payments from 
Student Assistance Funds (SAF) and Academic Enhancement Funds 
(AEF).183 The NCAA supposedly earmarks these funds to “assist 
student-athletes in meeting financial needs, improve their welfare or 
academic support, or recognize academic achievement.”184 These 
funds and other arbitrarily permitted forms of compensation represent 
some form of a “wage” (deficient as it may be) paid to the athletes to 
 
MEDIA (Oct. 3, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/3/20896738/california-fair-
pay-to-play-act-college-athletes (“The only ones who aren’t making money are the athletes 
themselves. . . . [They] can get scholarships and small stipends but no sponsorship or endorsement deals 
of any kind.”). 
 179. Salinas v. Com. Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 150 (4th Cir. 2017) (“When a worker is 
economically dependent on a putative employer—or, in the event two or more entities codetermine the 
essential terms and conditions of the worker’s employment, his putative joint employers—he qualifies 
as an employee protected by the FLSA.” (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 
(1947), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–150, 99 Stat. 
787)); see also Walling, 330 U.S. at 152 (“The definition ‘suffer or permit to work’ was obviously not 
intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied compensation 
agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises of another.”). 
 180. Nocera, College Sports Charade, supra note 29 (“To people like me, who have been calling for 
players to be paid for years—and who are offended at how their free labor enriches everyone else in 
College Sports Inc.—it seems plain as day that [the NCAA’s amateurism rules preventing universities 
from paying athletes violate antitrust laws].”). 
 181. Livers II, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (citing Tony & Susan 
Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)). 
 182. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1071–74, 1106; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
 183. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1072; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244–45. 
 184. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1072 & n.15; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1245. 
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perform their work by competing in their respective sports.185 
Earning a set wage as defined by superiors who deny the workers any 
input as to the amount of the wage is again indicative of an 
employer–employee relationship entitled to FLSA protection.186 
Thus, the NCAA’s own stubbornness and intentional regulation of 
athlete compensation—depriving college athletes the opportunity to 
experience the profits and losses generated by their work in their 
respective sports—ironically also weigh in favor of classifying the 
athletes as employees under the FLSA.187 
 
 185. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1072 n.15; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1245. 
 186. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 808–10 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that a worker who has no input 
whatsoever in the amount of compensation they receive for their services means the worker has “no 
control over the essential determinants of profits in a business”); Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., 915 
F.3d 1050, 1059 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that a worker earning a set wage to perform a job for a fixed 
period of time supports a finding of an employer–employee relationship). 
 187. Salinas v. Com. Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 150 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that economic 
dependence supports a finding of the existence of an employment relationship). As discussed supra 
notes 8–12 and accompanying text, multiple states have passed laws granting college athletes the right 
to earn compensation derived from the use of their NILs, threatening to take the control away from the 
NCAA and allow the athletes an opportunity to experience profit. Zagger, supra note 10. The NCAA 
responded to the mounting legislative pressure by announcing plans to modernize its own NIL rules to 
“permit students participating in athletics the opportunity to benefit from the use of their NILs,” but 
again, strictly subject to the governing body’s regulation. Sallee & Silverstein, supra note 15; 
Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules Changes, supra note 7; see also Pickman, supra note 14; 
McCollough, supra note 14 (“[T]he NCAA statement included the word ‘compensation’ only once, as 
in: ‘Make clear that compensation for athletics performance or participation is impermissible.’”). In an 
even more desperate attempt to maintain control over athlete compensation, the NCAA lobbied 
Congress to adopt federal NIL legislation that would preempt the state laws allowing college athletes to 
profit off of their NILs. Dellenger, NCAA’s Congressional NIL Proposal, supra note 16; see also 
Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14; Berkowitz, Colorado NIL Law, supra note 
10. Though allowing college athletes to profit off of their NILs may actually tip the scale of factor two 
away from employee status, the NCAA’s insistence on maintaining control over NIL compensation 
could negate any shifting of the scales. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14; Brent 
Schrotenboer, NCAA Petitions U.S. Supreme Court in Bid to Preserve Amateurism, USA TODAY: 
SPORTS, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2020/10/15/ncaa-petitions-supreme-court-preserve-
college-sports-amateurism/3664496001/ [https://perma.cc/G26V-NPTW] (Oct. 15, 2020, 1:43 PM). 
Perhaps in an attempt to safeguard the governing body from another ironic side effect of such 
modernization (allowing athletes to receive compensation for their NILs undercuts the basic premise of 
the NCAA’s amateurism principles), the NCAA’s proposal to Congress also included a subsection 
codifying the amateur status of college athletes, preventing a finding that the athletes qualify as 
employees. Zagger, supra note 10. Just because the governing body may appear ready to (reluctantly) 
allow college athletes to profit from the commercial use of their NILs while still in school “doesn’t 
mean the NCAA is willing to let go of the concept of amateurism in college sports.” Schrotenboer, 
 
47
Daly: Amateur Hour Is Over
Published by Reading Room, 2021
518 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
3. College Athletes’ Personal Investment in Equipment and 
Materials 
Another consequence flowing from the NCAA’s control over 
college athletes is that the athletes themselves are not required to 
personally invest in facilities and equipment.188 Individuals who 
personally invest in tools and equipment needed to perform their 
respective work are typically classified as independent contractors 
not entitled to coverage under the FLSA.189 The materials and 
equipment needed to participate in college athletics, on the other 
hand, are typically provided to the athletes by their universities.190 
Universities frequently invest increasing amounts of the revenue 
generated from college athletics—amounts that could be used to 
compensate the athletes—into upgrading athletic facilities and 
equipment.191 Universities also enter into multi-million dollar apparel 
contracts to provide athletes with the equipment necessary for 
participation in athletics and then some.192 Because college athletes 
are not required to individually invest in facilities and equipment like 
independent contractors, this factor also weighs in favor of finding 
that college athletes qualify as employees under the FLSA.193 
 
supra; see also NCAA Petitions Supreme Court, supra note 28 (concluding the NCAA’s official 
announcement regarding its petition for the Supreme Court to review the Alston case by stating that the 
governing body “will continue to defend the line between professional sports and college sports”). 
 188. Colwell, supra note 3, at 927. 
 189. Id. at 926 (first citing DOL FACT SHEET #13, supra note 105; and then citing Chao v. Mid-Atl. 
Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App’x 104, 107 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 190. Id. at 927; NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 16.8. 
 191. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1085, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 
2020); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1249 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[I]n 2013, the Power Five began 
to urge the NCAA to loosen its compensation restrictions based on a concern that existing rules 
incongruously allowed schools to spend on virtually anything, including palatial athletic facilities and 
seven-figure coaches’ salaries, except direct financial support for student-athletes.”); MURPHY, supra 
note 1, at 9; McCann, NCAA Landmark Loss, supra note 25. 
 192. MURPHY, supra note 1. 
 193. Colwell, supra note 3, at 927. 
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4. Level of Athletic Skill Required 
Ironically, the importance of an athlete’s skill and ability actually 
weighs against finding that college athletes qualify as employees 
under the FLSA.194 Highly skilled workers who maintain the ability 
to make independent business decisions about whom they work for 
are typically classified as independent contractors rather than 
employees entitled to FLSA protection.195 Not only do top-tier 
Division I athletes possess elite athletic skills, but these skills are 
exactly what make them desirable recruits for top-rated programs.196 
Some schools and apparel companies have even willfully violated 
NCAA rules in efforts to land commitments from highly-touted 
prospects.197 Because the athletes are the ones in demand, they enjoy 
a certain degree of decision-making power when choosing where to 
attend school and render their services.198 This ability to make 
personal “business judgments” weighs against finding that college 
athletes qualify as employees under the FLSA.199 
 
 194. Id. at 929. 
 195. Id. (citing DOL FACT SHEET #13, supra note 105). 
 196. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (defining the relevant market as one where schools are 
characterized as the buyers of recruits selling their athletic services and licensing rights); see also Alston 
II, 958 F.3d at 1248, 1266 (“Based on these analyses, [the district court] also found that, but for the 
challenged restraints, schools would offer recruits compensation that more closely correlates with their 
talent.”). 
 197. Hobson & Strauss, supra note 11 (observing that, in reference to the Department of Justice’s 
investigation into Adidas youth basketball operations, major shoe companies and universities are 
already attempting to pay top-rated high school recruits). 
 198. Colwell, supra note 3, at 929 (“A student-athlete is similar to an independent contractor because 
his skills and specialization allow him to make ‘business judgements’ and use his talents as leverage 
when being recruited by schools.”). 
 199. Id. These “business judgments” differ from the ability to make “business decisions” allowing an 
employee to experience profits and losses because the judgment is one of individual interest. Id. at 928. 
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5. Permanence of the Relationship Between the NCAA and the 
College Athletes 
As a result of the nature of college athletics, the duration of the 
relationship between the athletes, their universities, and the NCAA is 
confined to a finite period of time.200 Typically, a longer and more 
permanent relationship between the alleged worker and employer 
suggests the existence of an employment relationship.201 But a 
temporary relationship does not defeat the existence of an 
employment relationship if the temporariness is a product of the 
industry in which the individual is employed, however.202 This is 
precisely the case with college athletics because the NCAA alone 
defines the parameters of eligibility in terms of the number of 
seasons an athlete can participate in their respective sport.203 
Further, the NCAA represents the only viable option for college 
athletes realistically pursuing professional opportunities.204 Though 
alternative avenues such as the National Association of 
Intercollegiate Athletics or international competition are available, 
the combination of high-level television exposure and professional 
preparation place the NCAA in a league of its own.205 Additionally, 
the majority of professional sports leagues require at least one season 
of intercollegiate competition—or equivalent experience from a 
 
 200. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 12.8 (“A student-athlete shall not engage in 
more than four seasons of intercollegiate competition in any one sport.”). 
 201. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Generally speaking, 
“‘independent contractors” often have fixed employment periods and transfer from place to place as 
particular work is offered to them, whereas “employees” usually work for only one employer and such 
relationship is continuous and of indefinite duration.’” (quoting Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 811 (10th 
Cir. 1989))). 
 202. Id. (“However, ‘[m]any seasonal businesses necessarily hire only seasonal employees, [and] that 
fact alone does not convert seasonal employees into seasonal independent contractors.’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Sec’y of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1537 (7th Cir. 1987))). 
 203. See generally NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 12.8. 
 204. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1256–57 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 205. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067, 1097; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1256–57. 
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comparable alternative—to become eligible for professional 
competition.206 
Even though college athletes in the NCAA are confined to a 
maximum of four seasons of intercollegiate competition, their 
relationship with the NCAA is “permanent and exclusive for the 
duration of” their eligibility.207 The finite duration of the relationship 
is no different than that of students participating in a work-study 
program or student assistants engaging in a common-law 
employment relationship with their universities.208 Despite the 
temporary nature of college athletics—indeed because the temporary 
nature is imposed by a monopsony power—the permanency and 
exclusivity of the relationship between the athletes, their universities, 
and the NCAA weigh in favor of finding that college athletes qualify 
as employees under the FLSA.209 
 
 206. Kelly Hines, Going Pro: Which Sport Gets Draft Rules Right?, TULSA WORLD, 
https://www.tulsaworld.com/sportsextra/collegebasketball/going-pro-which-sport-gets-draft-rules-
right/article_ea5642ca-4a94-5084-bd1f-f3f3213cbec3.html [https://perma.cc/S5N7-X6FN] (Sept. 27, 
2019). 
 207. Baker, 137 F.3d at 1442 (quoting Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537) (finding that the relationship 
between oil and gas pipeline construction workers and the pipeline construction company, though 
seasonal and thus confined to a short duration, was still appropriately characterized as an employee–
employer relationship because the temporary nature of the position was defined by the market). NCAA 
Division I athletes maintain the ability to transfer universities for various reasons, but they ultimately 
remain under the NCAA’s umbrella and thus subject to the NCAA’s eligibility requirements. See 
generally NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at arts. 14.5–.5.6.10. 
 208. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that, 
under section 10b24(b) of the FOH, students participating in a work-study program while holding an 
additional job are generally considered employees under the FLSA); Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 
N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016) (finding that student assistants have a common-law employment 
relationship with their universities and thus qualify as statutory employees under the NLRA entitled to 
full bargaining rights and protection). Though the NLRA only governs private enterprises, its 
interpretation and application remain highly influential in the FLSA context. Novaes, supra note 46, at 
1542 n.44. 
 209. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (“[The NCAA has] near complete dominance of, and 
exercise[s] monopsony power in, the relevant market [of intercollegiate athletics] . . . .”); see also Alston 
II, 958 F.3d at 1248, 1270; Baker, 137 F.3d at 1442 (“Plaintiffs’ lack of permanence is due to natural 
characteristics in the industry, and not the independent choice usually exhibited by one who 
intentionally chooses to be in business for oneself.” (citing Baker v. Barnard Constr. Co., 860 F. Supp. 
766 (D.N.M. 1994), aff’d, 137 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. 1998)); NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, 
at art. 12.8. 
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6. College Athletes As an Integral Part of the NCAA’s Business 
As the actual competitors performing week-in and week-out and 
generating billions of dollars in revenue for Division I programs, 
college athletes are undeniably an integral part of the NCAA’s 
business.210 An individual performing an integral or vital task is more 
likely to be considered an employee if the business’s ultimate success 
depends on the completion of said task.211 As Judge Wilken observed 
in Alston, a college athlete’s task—more appropriately termed, 
“labor”—takes the form of performing their athletic services.212 
Judge Wilken even directly credited these services as the source of 
the extraordinary value of college athletics.213 The value of college 
athletics—specifically in the context of Division I men’s basketball 
and FBS football—is seemingly at an all-time high, as evidenced by 
the increasing revenues generated by universities and billion-dollar 
media rights contracts signed in recent years.214 If the athletes ever 
collectively ceased competition entirely, the NCAA would suffer 
catastrophic harm.215 Because of the NCAA’s undeniable 
 
 210. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 3; Campbell, supra note 178; see also Tynes, supra note 12 (“[The 
Fair Pay to Play Act] falls short of [California Senator Nancy Skinner’s] ultimate ambition of letting 
athletes earn a share of the revenues they help generate in the multibillion-dollar college sports 
industry.”). 
 211. Colwell, supra note 3, at 931. 
 212. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248. 
 213. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (“Moreover, the compensation that class members receive 
under the challenged rules is not commensurate with the value that they create for Division I basketball 
and FBS football; this value is reflected in the extraordinary revenues that [the NCAA] derive[s] from 
these sports.” (emphasis added)); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring) (“[T]hat is 
not because their athletic services have little value. On the contrary, the NCAA and Division I 
universities make billions of dollars from ticket sales, television contracts, merchandise, and other fruits 
that directly flow from the labors of Student-Athletes.”). 
 214. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1077–78; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1245; MURPHY, supra note 
1, at 11 (“In 2016, the Big Ten conference signed a six-year broadcast rights deal with Fox, ESPN, and 
CBS worth $2.64 billion.”); Murphy, NC NIL Bill, supra note 2 (detailing an $8.8 billion extension 
signed by CBS and Turner Sports in 2016 to broadcast the NCAA Tournament through 2032). 
 215. Ray Glier, California NIL Law Is Weak, Leaving NCAA Athletes on Their Own, Professor Says, 
FORBES (Nov. 19, 2019, 9:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rayglier/2019/11/19/california-law-
weak-so-athletes-on-their-own-with-nil/#5c13711d3fba [https://perma.cc/CQN4-W9T5] (“[I]f the 
athletes don’t get their rights they should walk out, boycott, refuse to play and tip over the system once 
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dependency on the labor of college athletes, this factor too weighs in 
overwhelming favor of finding that college athletes qualify as 
employees under the FLSA.216 
7. Other Factors Necessary to Assess Economic Reality 
Even when applying the Donovan factors, courts must still 
consider the totality of the circumstances when determining the 
economic reality of the relationship in question.217 In the context of 
college athletics, this necessitates an assessment of the effects of 
amateurism.218 As Judge Wilken made abundantly clear in Alston, 
however, the NCAA’s amateurism principles are inherently 
inconsistent.219 Moreover, a survey of the current landscape of 
 
and for all.”); Bobby Rush, Without Athletes, the Big Money in College Sports Disappears, U.S. NEWS 
(Apr. 2, 2013, 10:35 AM), https://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-ncaa-athletes-be-paid/without-
athletes-the-big-money-in-college-sports-disappears [https://perma.cc/CVL9-E3MN] (“Without [the 
athletes] . . . the billions of dollars that collegiate athletics generates simply would not exist.”); see also 
Silva et al., supra note 22 (speculating that conferences choosing to cancel the 2020 college football 
season in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic stemmed more from an institutional fear of college 
athletes organizing and unionizing rather than an effort to ensure athlete safety). This hypothetical 
almost became reality in the fall of 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic as athletes collectively 
threatened to opt out of competition entirely. See sources cited supra note 22. Though some individual 
athletes, and even collective conferences, did in fact opt out of competition for health-related concerns, 
the Power Five conferences were ultimately able to still put on a college football season, though the 
season was not without its fair share of speedbumps. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. The 
turmoil that accompanied the 2020 college football season was enough to stir skepticism about the 
NCAA’s ability to continue to exist as a governing body should any of the top revenue-generating 
conferences or institutions choose to secede from the association. See Drew & Miller, supra note 23. 
 216. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1429, 1529 (7th Cir. 1987); Donovan v. DialAmerica 
Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1385 (3d Cir. 1985). Though courts have found that college athletes are 
personally economically dependent on their athletic scholarships, the NCAA—paradoxically—is 
entirely economically dependent on the athletes. Livers II, No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. July 26, 2018) (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290 (1985)). 
 217. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Rutherford 
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)); Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 
285, 290 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992)); Livers I, 
No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 2291027, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2018) (citing Donovan, 757 F.2d at 1382). 
 218. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)); Livers I, 2018 WL 2291027, at *14. 
 219. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070–71, 1074–75 (recognizing (1) that the NCAA’s concept of 
amateurism has changed several times throughout its existence, suggesting that the principle is 
inherently inconsistent, and (2) that the NCAA’s current compensation regulations do not follow a 
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college athletics reveals an influx of legislative and player efforts 
attacking amateurism.220 The NCAA itself has even undermined its 
position on amateurism by admitting that its own NIL policies are 
outdated, implicitly conceding that the economic reality of its 
relationship with college athletes is no longer consistent with 
amateurism.221 As a result, amateurism no longer retains the weight it 
 
coherent definition of amateurism because the NCAA has failed to define the term anywhere within its 
Division I Bylaws); see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1259; Tynes, supra note 12 (“The doomsday rhetoric 
around paying players has existed as long as the NCAA has operated. The argument is that college 
athletics will implode if players are paid. Yet when has that ever been true?”). 
 220. Zagger, supra note 10 (discussing the California, Colorado, and Florida laws allowing athletes to 
earn compensation for the use of their NILs while observing that thirty-six total states have proposed 
similar legislation); Silva et al., supra note 22 (observing that “thousands of athletes across the country 
are demanding the basic rights long denied them”). 
 221. See Zagger, supra note 10; see also Iafolla, supra note 80 (“The NCAA is saying it’s OK for 
athletes to be paid as long as somebody else pays them . . . .” (quoting Michael Willemin, the attorney 
representing Trey Johnson in his pending FLSA lawsuit against the NCAA, discussed supra note 86)); 
NCAA NIL Announcement, supra note 13. Though the NCAA’s proposed NIL rules changes, on their 
face, seemingly undermine the governing body’s amateurism principles, the NCAA has signaled time 
and time again that it will do whatever it can to maintain the current concept of amateurism. 
Schrotenboer, supra note 187. Notably, the proposed NIL rules changes contain several restrictions on 
how college athletes may earn compensation from permissible marketing endeavors and still afford 
universities broad discretion to regulate such endeavors. Id.; Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules 
Changes, supra note 7. Such restrictions threaten to render any rules allowing college athletes to earn 
compensation “functionally useless,” drawing well-deserved criticism from advocates for athletes’ 
rights. Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules Changes, supra note 7 (“This disappointing proposal 
appears to be just more of the same from the NCAA, which has always prioritized its own self-interest 
above its athletes.” (quoting Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal)). Additionally, the NCAA made 
clear in its petition to the Supreme Court to rehear the Alston case that the governing body “will 
continue to defend the line between professional sports and college sports.” NCAA Petitions Supreme 
Court, supra note 28. In fact, the petition explicitly expressed the NCAA’s (legitimate) concerns that 
“[t]he ruling blurs the line between student-athletes and professionals,” and it is thus “critical for the 
Supreme Court to address the consequential legal errors in [the] case so that college sports can be 
governed, not by the courts, but by those who interact with and lead students every day.” Id.; 
Schrotenboer, supra note 187 (“The NCAA petitioned the Supreme Court . . . in an effort to save 
amateurism and avoid having to give players more than their current compensation, which has been 
restricted to the cost of attending college.”). These two developments—one seemingly monumental 
(reforming NCAA NIL policies to allow athletes to earn compensation for commercial use of their 
NILs) and the other a last-ditch effort (petitioning the Supreme Court for review of a case that allows 
athletes to receive additional compensation above the cost of attendance)—seem in direct conflict with 
one another yet came just one day apart. Schrotenboer, supra note 187. These paradoxical pursuits make 
abundantly clear that the NCAA sees the writing on the wall regarding its antiquated amateurism 
principles. Murphy, Framework for Federal College Sports Legislation, supra note 17 (“[The NCAA is] 
just in denial that college football and college basketball [are] professional.” (quoting Connecticut 
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once held in the economic reality analysis, and it no longer precludes 
a finding that college athletes qualify as employees under the 
FLSA.222 Accordingly, the NCAA must finally face reality and 
acknowledge that there is no longer a place for amateurism in 
modern college athletics.223 
III. PROPOSAL 
The landscape of college athletics has evolved rapidly, while the 
NCAA has stubbornly remained stagnant.224 Though the NCAA has 
bought itself some time—and saved some face—by announcing plans 
to reform its own NIL policies, the governing body still faces a bleak 
future unless it drastically alters its current model.225 Proactively 
 
Senator Chris Murphy)). 
 222. Berger, 843 F.3d at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (suggesting that there may be a time when the 
economic reality of amateurism may not preclude a finding that college athletes are employees under the 
FLSA). 
 223. Robert A. McCormick & Amy C. McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College 
Athlete As Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 156–57 (2006) (“To call NCAA Division I athletes in 
revenue-generating sports amateurs is farcical.”). 
 224. See Forde, supra note 33 (blaming the NCAA’s “failure to terminate the flawed concept of 
amateurism in a timely fashion” for the governing body’s ineffective responses to, and directives issued 
in the face of, the COVID-19 pandemic); Cunningham, supra note 150; Baker, supra note 150; Hanna, 
supra note 161; McCann, NCAA’s NIL Announcement: Key Takeaways, supra note 13. 
 225. Baker, supra note 150 (“The relatively rapid push for legislation in . . . states and in Congress 
represents a loss of deference for the NCAA’s bylaws and a tightening noose with regard to the political 
pressure placed on the NCAA to change those bylaws.”); McCann, California Game Changer, supra 
note 7; Murphy, Florida’s NIL Timeline, supra note 11 (noting that Florida’s NIL law is set to take 
effect in July 2021, placing great pressure on the NCAA to act quickly); McCollough, supra note 14 
(“This [NCAA NIL-policy-amendment announcement] is another attempt at stalling on this issue.” 
(quoting National College Players Association Executive Director Ramogi Huma)). Experts initially 
expected the NCAA’s proposed NIL rules changes to pass the Division I Council’s official vote in 
January of 2021, but the Council tabled the vote shortly after the Supreme Court granted cert. to review 
Alston. Russo, supra note 14 (suggesting initially that the proposed rules changes would “likely” pass 
vote in January and go into effect for the 2021–2022 academic year); Hosick, supra note 15 
(announcing that the Division I Council elected to delay the formal vote to adopt the proposed NIL rules 
changes). Until such rules changes are formally implemented, however, critics and legislators remain 
skeptical of any actual benefit that may result from NCAA NIL reform. Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils 
Proposed Rules Changes, supra note 7 (noting that the proposed rules changes would still be far more 
restrictive than, and thus at odds with, already-enacted state legislation set to take effect in the near 
future). Further, the NCAA’s desperate plea for federal legislation could actually backfire on the 
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abandoning its antiquated amateurism principles and recognizing 
college athletes as employees under the FLSA would not only benefit 
the athletes but it could save the NCAA from extinction.226 Critics 
argue that forcing the NCAA and its member institutions to pay 
college athletes a guaranteed minimum wage would financially 
cripple the industry, though studies suggest that the entities would 
actually still be able to operate profitably.227 In fact, implementing 
 
governing body because it turns out that legislators on both sides of the aisle seem to empathize with the 
athletes who have been exploited rather than the executives who have reaped the benefits of the athletes’ 
free labor. Murphy, Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill, supra note 17 (noting that proposed federal legislation 
“stops short of implementing all of the restrictions that the NCAA and other college sports 
administrators have asked Congress to help them impose,” and that some legislators view the bipartisan 
bill as “an interim step on a path toward eventually giving college athletes an opportunity to be paid like 
professionals”). But see Dellenger, Congress Introduces NIL Bill, supra note 17. Though one piece of 
proposed federal legislation grants the NCAA many of its desired protections (including antitrust 
exemption and provisions preventing schools from classifying athletes as employees), the bill is likely to 
face stark opposition that could halt the bill’s potential progress following the Democrats’ recent 
victories in the Senate. Dellenger, Landmark College Athletes Bill of Rights, supra note 17. The College 
Athletes Bill of Rights, discussed supra note 17, represents the most formidable proposal for federal 
legislation regulating college athletics, threatening to statutorily eradicate the NCAA’s amateurism 
principles. See Berkowitz, Democrats Introduce College Athletes Bill of Rights, supra note 22 
(recognizing that the proposed legislation contains numerous clauses that “run[] counter to proposals for 
NIL rules changes the NCAA is scheduled to vote on” because the bill’s sponsors, including former 
Stanford football player and current New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, “want to see athletes annually 
receive money directly based on the revenue surpluses they help their teams generate”). 
 226. Nicolas A. Novy, Note, “The Emperor Has No Clothes”: The NCAA’s Last Chance As the 
Middle Man of College Athletics, 21 SPORTS LAWS. J. 227, 249 (2014) (“[I]f the NCAA were to 
reformulate its bylaws to redistribute some of the wealth to the teams that earn it, it would face a much 
better chance of continuing to control the market for college athletes.”); Geoffrey J. Rosenthal, College 
Play and the FLSA: Why Student-Athletes Should Be Classified As “Employees” Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 35 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 160 (2017) (“It is possible that eliminating 
‘amateurism’ in college athletics would actually work in the NCAA’s favor because ‘hypocrisy and 
corruption will no longer be core components [of supporting the NCAA].’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Patrick Hruby, The Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on Amateurism, THE 
ATLANTIC: CULTURE (July 25, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/07/the-
olympics-show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275/ [https://perma.cc/2VUN-
D84K])). 
 227. Caroline K. Kane, Comment, The NCAA Is Dropping the Ball: Refining the Rights of 
Student-Athletes, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 171, 208 (2016). For a detailed analysis of the feasibility of the 
NCAA and its member universities paying guaranteed wages to college athletes, see Marc Edelman, The 
Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA 
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports, 
92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1053 (2014). 
56
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/7
2021] AMATEUR HOUR IS OVER 527 
such procedures would not be far off from those currently in place 
that provide FLSA-compliant payments to students in work-study 
programs.228 
Still, because of the scale of Division I college athletics, the 
feasibility concerns have merit and must be addressed with 
specifically tailored models.229 Two such models could appropriately 
compensate college athletes as employees under the FLSA while 
allowing the NCAA to remain in place as the governing body of 
college athletics. The first allows member institutions to voluntarily 
opt out of the existing amateurism model to provide direct salaries to 
athletes that will no longer be tied to education. The second proposes 
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that sets sport-specific 
salary caps based on an econometric model and evenly distributes 
university funds generated from NIL promotion across all sports at 
each university. 
A. Refuting the Myth of the “Student-Athlete”: Optional Education 
Though Judge Wilken largely dismissed the NCAA’s amateurism 
principles as justification for the NCAA’s compensation regulations, 
she credited one lone procompetitive justification: preserving a 
distinction between college and professional athletics to maintain 
consumer demand.230 But does such a distinction really exist in the 
modern landscape of college athletics?231 The distinction is 
traditionally thought to be rooted in the NCAA’s commitment to 
 
 228. See Dan Murphy, Lawsuit Makes Another Attempt at Wages for All College Athletes, ESPN 
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/28029070/lawsuit-makes-another-
attempt-wages-all-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/A8RS-2ENZ]; Witz, supra note 86. 
 229. Kane, supra note 227. 
 230. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1257 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Thus, the district court properly ‘credit[ed] the 
importance to consumer demand of maintaining a distinction between college and professional sport.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082)). 
 231. McCann, California Game Changer, supra note 7 (observing that college athletics mimic 
professional sports in the aspects of lucrative media contracts, facilities, and coach salaries).  
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tying athletic competition to a pursuit of education.232 But a closer 
examination of the modern “student-athlete” breeds skepticism about 
just how important the “student” aspect truly is.233 
Academics frequently take a backseat to athletic commitments for 
the athletes.234 Due to the already overwhelming time commitments 
of their respective sports, athletes are steered away from demanding 
classes and majors.235 Still, recent investigations have revealed an 
educational community rife with academic fraud.236 Even those 
athletes legitimately pursuing a degree face an uphill battle due to the 
strenuous time commitments of intercollegiate athletics.237 Once you 
 
 232. Michael McCann, Six Reasons to Be Skeptical of Proposals to Tax College Athletes’ 
Scholarships, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 30, 2019) [hereinafter McCann, Six Skepticisms], 
https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/30/ncaa-name-image-likeness-tax-scholarship-richard-burr 
[https://perma.cc/J6E7-3WE7] (characterizing the NCAA’s “long[-]standing advocacy of 
student-athletes’ academic success” as central to the collegiate model). 
 233. Id. (recognizing that “there are real questions about the quality of education received by some 
athletes”); Cunningham, supra note 150 (“Preserving the [amateurism] model requires maintaining the 
myth of athletes as regular students.”); Nocera, College Sports Charade, supra note 29 (calling the 
NCAA’s supposed prioritization of education for college athletes “laughable”). 
 234. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring); Kevin Trahan, Athletes Are Getting Degrees, 
but Does That Actually Mean Anything?, SB NATION (July 9, 2014, 7:03 PM), 
https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/7/9/5885433/ncaa-trial-student-athletes-education; 
Zócalo Pub. Square, Why Student Athletes Continue to Fail, TIME (Apr. 20, 2015, 10:34 AM), 
https://time.com/3827196/why-student-athletes-fail/ [https://perma.cc/2Z63-A7E7]. 
 235. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring) (“As amici describe, Student-Athletes work an 
average of [thirty-five-to-forty] hours per week on athletic duties during their months-long athletic 
seasons, and most work similar hours during the off-season to stay competitive.”); Hruby, supra note 
167. 
 236. Hruby, supra note 167; Trahan, supra note 234; Zócalo Pub. Square, supra note 234. 
 237. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring); Dennis Dodd, Pac-12 Study Reveals Athletes 
‘Too Exhausted to Study Effectively,’ CBS SPORTS (Apr. 21, 2015 5:05 AM), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/pac-12-study-reveals-athletes-too-exhausted-to-study-
effectively/ [https://perma.cc/76SJ-5JFC] (“Pac-12 athletes spend an average of [fifty] hours per week 
on their sport and are often ‘too exhausted to study effectively,’ a Pac-12 study revealed . . . .” (citing 
PENN SCHOEN BERLAND, STUDENT-ATHLETE TIME DEMANDS 2 (2015), 
https://sports.cbsimg.net/images/Pac-12-Student-Athlete-Time-Demands-Obtained-by-CBS-Sports.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39LA-YDJ5])); Malcolm Lemmons, If You’re a College Athlete, Your Degree Might 
Mean Next to Nothing, HUFFPOST (May 5, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/if-youre-an-college-
athlete-your-degree-might-mean_b_58e3dfd1e4b09dbd42f3dae8 [https://perma.cc/XR7M-3U3Z] 
(“Athletes are merely being offered the opportunity to be educated without substantial access or time to 
gain any necessary resources, experience or skills, which are what actually lead to success in the real 
world. . . . In actuality, they don’t get a real education.”). For a detailed study of the time demands of 
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remove education from the equation, however, the only remaining 
dissimilarity between college and professional sports is the amount of 
compensation the athletes receive.238 
Accepting both the reality that education falls far from the 
forefront of college athletics and that the athletes qualify as 
employees under the FLSA, as discussed supra Section II.B, means 
they are no longer “student-athletes” but rather “employee-athletes” 
instead.239 This characterization puts the athletes on the same ground 
as traditional university employees who receive a salary and enjoy 
optional educational opportunities.240 Rather than allow individual 
athletes to independently opt out of their educational commitments, 
however, the decision should lie with the universities to maintain 
consistency across athletic departments and to avoid placing the 
universities in a situation that requires the schools to treat 
similarly-situated athletes dissimilarly—an outcome that would raise 
more than its fair share of administrative issues.241 Because only a 
small percentage of Division I institutions may be profitable enough 
to sustain paying athletes salaries untethered to education, the NCAA 
could allow member institutions to elect to do so under the optional 
educational model or continue to operate under the traditional 
amateurism model.242 
 
college athletics, see PENN SCHOEN BERLAND, supra. 
 238. Ramsey, supra note 38. For a detailed examination of the similarities between college athletes of 
revenue-generating sports and their professional counterparts in the form of lucrative media deals, 
revenue generation, and coach salaries, see id. 
 239. Cunningham, supra note 150 (“Eventually, schools no longer will be able to pretend athletes 
aren’t employees.”); McCormick & McCormick, supra note 223, at 157 (“The NCAA’s droning 
insistence on labeling them ‘student-athletes’ is done simply to shore up the fiction that they are 
something other than employees.”). 
 240. Jamie Nicole Johnson, Note, Removing the Cloak of Amateurism: Employing College Athletes 
and Creating Optional Education, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 1003 (2015). 
 241. See Colwell, supra note 3, at 938 (considering administrative issues that may arise for schools to 
independently determine which athletes are owed a salary, how much, and for how many hours). 
 242. See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics in the Next 
Millennium: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 253, 255–70 (1999); 
Mull, supra note 23 (“If some conferences manage to play [during the COVID-19 pandemic], they’ll tap 
into television deals worth hundreds of millions of dollars, gaining an advantage in recruiting 
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This salary would essentially take the place of the current 
grant-in-aid stipend model that covers expenses for athletes living off 
campus but provides a fairer alternative for the athletes above the 
cost of attendance.243 The NCAA and its member institutions would 
negotiate a fixed salary across all Division I athletic programs 
choosing to opt out of the traditional amateurism model.244 Setting a 
fixed salary would lessen the disparity among the universities 
electing to operate under the optional educational model, thus 
promoting competition while still avoiding a professional-style open 
market.245 
This model raises certain concerns that could prove detrimental to 
the NCAA in the long run, however. For example, setting a fixed 
salary could potentially raise antitrust concerns as an agreement 
amongst institutions to restrain trade.246 Additionally, allowing 
institutions to completely forego imposing an educational 
requirement to a college athlete’s university commitment would turn 
college athletics into a de facto minor league.247 Doing so would 
essentially eliminate the distinction between college and professional 
athletics248—a distinction that is already blurry at best249—even 
while preventing a completely open market. Because such an 
outcome contradicts the credited justification accepted by Judge 
Wilken (and subsequently the Ninth Circuit), an alternative model 
may be more beneficial for the NCAA.250 
 
high-school players and luring stars away from suspended leagues.”). 
 243. Johnson, supra note 240. 
 244. Id. at 1011. 
 245. Id. at 1012. 
 246. Id. at 1011. 
 247. Rosenthal, supra note 226, at 163–64. 
 248. McCann, Six Skepticisms, supra note 232. 
 249. Murphy, Framework for Federal College Sports Legislation, supra note 17 (“[The NCAA is] 
just in denial that college football and college basketball [are] professional.” (quoting Connecticut 
Senator Chris Murphy)). 
 250. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1257–58 (9th Cir. 2020). 
60
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/7
2021] AMATEUR HOUR IS OVER 531 
B. Collective Bargaining Salary Caps and University Group 
Licensing Unions 
Instead of simply allowing universities to voluntarily opt out of the 
traditional amateurism model, the NCAA should abandon the model 
altogether and restructure its Division I Bylaws to equitably 
distribute the revenue generated from college athletics.251 Rather than 
starting from scratch, the NCAA can build off of existing 
frameworks already in place for students in work-study programs 
who operate under similar circumstances but enjoy FLSA 
protections.252 For instance and perhaps most importantly, the NCAA 
should adopt a collective bargaining approach, like those 
implemented in work-study unions, to negotiate directly with the 
athletes to reach equitable resolutions to ancillary disputes.253 Not 
 
 251. Novy, supra note 226. 
 252. Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 111. 
 253. Id. (“[C]ollective bargaining already exists within the student-employment framework with 
graduate assistants for doctoral students.”); Novaes, supra note 46, at 1582–83 (recognizing that 
collective bargaining is a “regimented process with a mandatory scope of bargaining that is more 
appropriate for meaningful labor disputes”); see also Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an 
Invisible Labor Market: College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077, 
1085 (2012) (proposing a collegiate CBA similar to the one implemented by the NFL because of the 
similarities between the restrictions imposed by the NFL that led to the adoption of its initial CBA and 
the restrictions currently imposed by the NCAA). College athletics lag behind their counterparts in 
professional leagues, which allow for athletes to unionize and advocate for their own interests under the 
protection of labor laws. Nadkarni, supra note 161. The need for a college union became more evident 
than ever during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. (“As schools make decisions that could profoundly 
impact the lives of their athletes, with little or no input from those athletes themselves, college football 
players are plainly lacking the key mechanism that protects their professional counterparts: A union.”); 
Wolken, supra note 154 (“[C]ollege athletes have no . . . ability to demand certain safeguards or 
expanded health care or that they’re getting something more than their scholarship for playing football 
during a pandemic.”). Recognizing that the circumstances surrounding the 2020 college football season 
presented a “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunity, thousands of college athletes unified in an unprecedented 
exhibition of advocacy for their own rights. Wolken, supra note 154 (“There’s never been a more 
opportune time in the history of the NCAA for athletes to form a union and wield real power to 
negotiate their compensation, their working conditions and their rights.”); Silva et al., supra note 22. In 
a simple social media post, college football players collectively issued a call to unionize, demanding 
equality and advocating for social justice. Lia Assimakopoulos, College Football Players Attempt to 
Unionize As Hope for a Season Dies Out, NBC SPORTS WASH. (Aug. 10, 2020, 1:27 PM), 
https://www.nbcsports.com/washington/ncaa/college-football-players-attempt-unionize-hope-season-
dies-out [https://perma.cc/PEV3-Z3JZ]. Though ultimately unsuccessful at the time, the unification of 
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only would a CBA provide the athletes with a more substantial voice 
in the governing process, but it would also allow the NCAA to 
continue to enforce rules and requirements tied to education while 
still addressing the administrative hurdles that would arise from 
recognizing athletes as employees.254 
Because athletes from different universities have varied interests, 
the NCAA should allow universities to form individual unions to 
 
college athletes during the 2020 college football season lends hope for future movements that could 
further build on the groundwork of past attempts to unionize. Nadkarni, supra note 161; see also 
Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B., No. 167, 1350 (2015). Future movements will also benefit from 
judicial developments that, for the first time ever, suggest (and support finding) that college athletes 
have a right to unionize to protect their economic and personal interests. See Nadkarni, supra note 161 
(“There is a need for some type of union. As of now, student-athletes don’t have anything.”); see also 
Wolken, supra note 154 (observing that allowing college athletes to unionize “would benefit [both] the 
athletes and the schools, whose resistance to collective bargaining has led them down the path of endless 
antitrust lawsuits and feckless attempts to placate lawyers and courts that only serve to blur the lines of 
amateurism and expose how arbitrary the entire system is”). 
 254. Lonick, supra note 1, at 167 (“Collective bargaining would ensure the NCAA enforces rules to 
keep student-athletes on track to graduate—a fair outcome given the NCAA’s activism in preventing 
student-athletes from reaping financial gains while in college.”); Nadkarni, supra note 161 
(“Unionization would . . . mak[e] players an active part of the return process. It would also give them a 
say in how schools handle their safety once they’re on campus. Without it? ‘There are zero ways to 
address abuse . . . .’” (quoting National College Players Association Executive Director Ramogi 
Huma)); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ 
[https://perma.cc/955Z-YXJQ] (“The most basic reform would treat the students as what they are—
adults, with rights and reason of their own—and grant them a meaningful voice in NCAA 
deliberations.”). Recognizing college athletes as employees under the FLSA would raise a myriad of 
issues—such as administrative issues, Title IX compliance, tax implications, sovereign immunity, and 
potential applicability of FLSA exemptions—that must be addressed but fall outside of the scope of this 
Note. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 49, Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 
F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15973), 2017 WL 5632769, at *39. It is worth noting, however, that a 
CBA likely represents the most effective way to address these issues collectively and efficiently. 
Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 110 (“Collective bargaining could allow the NCAA to work with 
student-athletes directly to negotiate a system that fits with college athletics while still complying with 
the FLSA.”). For a discussion on the potential impact of Title IX, see Josephine R. Potuto et al., What’s 
in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. 
L. REV. 879, 938–39 (2014), and Colwell, supra note 3, at 940. For a discussion on potential tax 
implications, see Kane, supra note 227, at 204 (“Significantly, even if student-athletes were considered 
employees, their athletic scholarships would still not be taxed.”). For a discussion on the potential 
impact of sovereign immunity, see Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 104–05 (emphasizing the importance of 
finding that the NCAA qualifies as an employer under the joint-employer doctrine). For a discussion on 
the potential applicability of FLSA exemptions, see Rosenthal, supra note 226, at 166 (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 213), and Ehrlich, supra note 9, at 106.  
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represent the interests of their athletes and then negotiate with the 
NCAA directly.255 To preserve consistency across Division I athletics 
and limit disparity between universities, however, the NCAA should 
impose two overarching requirements: (1) set a sport-specific salary 
cap across all universities with a minimum compensation floor; and 
(2) require that all universities adopt a group licensing model to 
evenly distribute revenue generated from the use of athletes’ NILs 
across all sports. 
1. Sport-Specific Salary Cap 
Once recognized as employees under the FLSA, all college 
athletes will be entitled to a guaranteed minimum compensation.256 
To remain consistent with Judge Wilken’s ruling in Alston, however, 
the NCAA cannot create an open market akin to that in professional 
sports.257 The NCAA could avoid such an outcome by imposing 
sport-specific salary caps across Division I athletics.258 Under this 
model, the NCAA and representatives from the university-specific 
 
 255. Lonick, supra note 1, at 170 (citing Novy, supra note 226, at 246); see also LeRoy, supra note 
253, at 1119–20 (proposing a “unique hybrid form of collective bargaining that draws from elements in 
the NLRA and state collective bargaining laws” while imposing limits that preserve the amateur 
character of NCAA athletic competition). For a detailed discussion of the NLRA and state law aspects 
included in this unique CBA proposal, see LeRoy, supra note 253, at 1121–29. 
 256. Rosenthal, supra note 226, at 135 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206). 
 257. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1258 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 258. Wayne M. Cox, One Shining Moment to a Dark Unknown Future: How the Evolution of the 
Right of Publicity Hammers Home the Final Nail in the NCAA’s Argument on Amateurism in Collegiate 
Athletics, 80 ALB. L. REV. 195, 229 (2017) (citing Joe Nocera, A Way to Start Paying College Athletes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/sports/a-way-to-start-paying-college-
athletes.html [https://perma.cc/6D7Y-44F6] (proposing that the National College Players Association, 
on behalf of the Power Five conferences, negotiate a salary cap and minimum salaries with the NCAA)). 
Though a salary cap is not inherently distinctive of professional sports (each of the five major 
professional sports leagues—the MLB, MLS, NBA, NFL, and NHL—all have some form of a salary 
cap), the collegiate salary cap would be set significantly lower than the inflated caps in professional 
sports to ensure compliance with Judge Wilken’s accepted procompetitive effect of the NCAA’s rules. 
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 58, Alston II, No. 19-15566 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019). 
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unions would negotiate the salary cap as part of the CBA, basing the 
cap on an econometric model.259 
The econometric model would estimate the average value 
generated per college athlete based on the average revenue generated 
for their respective sport, categorizing universities into different 
percentiles based on average annual revenue.260 The model would 
calculate average revenue generation into twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and 
seventy-fifth percentiles.261 To limit the potential effect of disparities 
between the most and least profitable athletic departments, the salary 
cap would adopt the average value of the fiftieth percentile.262 
The model would then extrapolate these values to encompass the 
minimum roster size for each sport to determine the total cap for the 
team. Once calculated, half of the resulting total would define the 
amount allocable to the athletes, while the remaining half would 
cover the salaries for the coaches and support staff.263 Dividing the 
allocation of cap space between the athletes and the coaches would 
combat the potential for universities or boosters to provide 
incentivizing payments to lure recruits to commit to a certain 
school.264 The NCAA and university representatives would 
renegotiate the salary cap periodically to account for shifting market 
conditions. 
Because the econometric model attempts to place a value on a 
college athletes’ contributions based on generated revenue, the model 
may be difficult to implement across all sports.265 A simpler model, 
 
 259. Potuto, supra note 254, at 919. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 936. 
 262. Id. at 923 (concluding that, according to a 2013 econometric analysis, a football player on a team 
in the fiftieth percentile had a marginal revenue product of approximately $101,000 per year, while a 
men’s basketball player in the same percentile had a marginal revenue product of approximately 
$127,000 per year). 
 263. Cox, supra note 258. 
 264. McCollough, supra note 14 (“The fear is that a booster for one school will pay far above 
perceived market value . . . to secure [a recruit’s] commitment to the school.”). 
 265. Rosenthal, supra note 226, at 167 (“Basing a student-athlete’s pay on the revenue generated by 
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perhaps, would be to provide each college athlete with a defined 
stipend on top of their grant-in-aid scholarships to make up for lost 
wages while also providing performance-based bonuses for athletic 
achievements such as winning championships or earning 
accolades.266 Such bonuses would function similarly to SAF and AEF 
payments—which are currently permissible under the NCAA 
regulations—by equitably distributing gross revenue produced from 
different sports.267 Unlike the SAF and AEF payments, however, 
these distributions would be directly tied to each individual 
university’s success rather than distributed at the discretion of the 
conferences.268 
Both models would result in some disparity between programs, 
however, because they are each directly tied to the revenue generated 
from athletics. Because smaller programs typically generate less 
revenue than larger programs, the performance-based model may 
only exacerbate the gap that already exists between profitable Power 
Five programs and smaller universities.269 The econometric model, 
on the other hand, results in internal disparity amongst a university’s 
revenue-generating and non-revenue-generating sports.270 The 
 
his or her university, or even the revenue that is attributable to his or her team would also be an 
interesting tack, though the details of such a system may be too convoluted to be put into action.”). 
 266. Cork Gaines, Texas AD Says It Would Cost $6 Million to Pay Their Athletes and the Fallout 
Would Change College Sports Forever, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2014, 5:40 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/university-texas-pay-athletes-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/45NJ-FYA7]; 
see also NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 12.1.2.4.3 (establishing that 
performance-based bonuses are permissible so long as “such payments and expenses provided to the 
individual [do] not exceed his or her actual and necessary expenses to participate on the team”). Before 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in O’Bannon, University of Texas Athletic Director Steve Patterson stated 
that, if the court required the NCAA to compensate athletes in some form, the University of Texas 
would provide a $10,000 stipend to all athletes and have no problem covering the estimated $6 million 
expense. Gaines, supra. 
 267. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1072–73 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing the distribution of SAF 
and AEF payments), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see also discussion supra note 129 (providing 
an overview of other currently permissible forms of compensation).  
 268. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070. 
 269. Johnson, supra note 240, at 1001. 
 270. Potuto, supra note 254, at 919. 
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NCAA could easily mitigate this disparity through the 
implementation of a university-specific group licensing agreement. 
2. University Group Licensing 
Currently, college athletes grant their universities exclusive rights 
to market their NILs while enrolled at the university.271 The NCAA 
plans to revise these current regulations, but substantive changes are 
not expected to take effect before the 2021–2022 academic year at 
the earliest.272 Rather than allowing each individual college athlete to 
independently pursue marketing opportunities (as California’s Fair 
Pay to Play Act provides) and to avoid a potential “patchwork” of 
state-specific legislation,273 the NCAA can amend its Division I 
Bylaws to require universities to redistribute NIL-generated 
marketing funds back to the athletes evenly.274 
Again, the NCAA would not have to start from scratch and could 
adopt a group licensing model similar to that implemented by the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA).275 The 
MLBPA holds the exclusive rights to license active MLB players’ 
NILs and publicity rights.276 Under the group licensing arrangement, 
the MLBPA pools all revenue generated from the licensing of the 
 
 271. Novy, supra note 226, at 24. 
 272. Murphy, NCAA Group Supports NIL Plan, supra note 14; Russo, supra note 14; Sallee & 
Silverstein, supra note 15. Though originally slated to vote on the proposed NIL rules changes in 
January of 2021, the NCAA’s Division I Council elected to delay the vote in mid-January, citing 
“several external factors,” such as “judicial, political and enforcement issues.” Hosick, supra note 15. 
 273. Murphy, Florida’s NIL Timeline, supra note 11 (recognizing that NCAA President Mark 
Emmert “is concerned that a ‘patchwork’ of state laws would cause student-athletes to pick schools 
based on where they can make the most money and give some athletic programs an unequal recruiting 
advantage”). 
 274. This proposal mirrors one of many provisions included in the College Athletes Bill of Rights, 
discussed supra note 17. See Murphy, Framework for Federal College Sports Legislation, supra note 17 
(observing that the College Athletes Bill of Rights seeks to “[c]reate revenue-sharing agreements with 
associations, conference[s] and schools that [would] result in ‘fair and equitable compensation’”). 
 275. Novy, supra note 226, at 224. 
 276. MLB PLAYERS INC., https://www.mlbplayers.com/mlb-players-inc [https://perma.cc/8NW7-
VJ5K]. 
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players’ NILs and distributes the proceeds to the players on a pro rata 
basis according to the number of days each player logged on an 
active major league roster that season.277 Adapting this model to the 
context of college athletics, the NCAA would grant the 
university-specific unions exclusive rights to market the NILs of its 
athletes in association with the school.278 The universities would pool 
all revenue generated from the marketing and advertising of its 
athletes’ NILs and then evenly distribute a percentage of those funds 
to all athletes at the university. 
Importantly, this revision to the NCAA’s Division I Bylaws would 
negate the governing body’s monopsony status.279 By granting each 
university independent responsibility for marketing the publicity 
rights of its own athletes, the NCAA would no longer maintain 
exclusive control over the NILs of college athletes.280 Despite 
relinquishing control over the operation of college athletics, this 
revision could resolidify the NCAA’s necessity as a governing body 
in college athletics.281 In fact, the NCAA would take on an even more 
important role in regulating commercial activity to prevent fraudulent 
or exploitative transactions.282 Additionally, allowing marketing 
 
 277. The Players Choice Group Licensing Program, MLB PLAYERS INC. (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.nmnathletics.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_LANG=C&DB_OEM_ID=34000&ATCLID=21
1072624 [https://perma.cc/27KA-3FCX]. In 2017, MLB players collectively received over $125 million 
in distributions from the MLBPA generated from the group licensing program. Eric Fisher & Liz 
Mullen, MLB Players Receive $125M from Union, SPORTS BUS. J. (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/05/14/Labor-and-Agents/MLBPA.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/83XH-X78U]. 
 278. Novy, supra note 226, at 24. 
 279. Id. at 24–25, 27–28. 
 280. Id. at 24–25. 
 281. Id. at 25. 
 282. Kane, supra note 227, at 206 (“With commercialization comes ‘ample opportunities for 
unethical behavior that the NCAA’s regulations and enforcement committees can address.’” (quoting 
Mathew R. Cali, The NCAA’s Transfer of Power: An Analysis of the Future Implications the Proposed 
NCAA Transfer Rules Will Have on the Landscape of College Sports, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS 
L.J. 217, 248–49 (2014))). 
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funds to flow directly to the athletes would limit the amount of 
money that universities must account for in compensating athletes.283 
This two-tiered approach successfully maintains the distinction 
between college and professional athletics highlighted by Judge 
Wilken in Alston by providing athletes with the benefits and 
protections they are entitled to as employees under the FLSA while 
preventing a professional-style open market. Further, 
university-specific unions and a collective bargaining platform 
provide the athletes with a voice to effectively represent their own 
interests while negotiating directly with the NCAA to maintain the 
foundational qualities of college athletics. Finally, this approach 
allows the NCAA to retain a critical role in governing and regulating 
college athletics even in the absence of amateurism requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
Tragedy permeates through the billion-dollar industry of college 
athletics in the form of the NCAA’s prohibition on compensating 
college athletes.284 The NCAA justifies this ban through its principles 
of amateurism, maintaining that college athletics simply would not 
exist if the athletes were paid.285 But then Judge Wilken of the 
Northern District of California exposed the hypocrisy underlying the 
NCAA’s amateurism principles as arbitrarily imposed and baselessly 
enacted.286 A perfect storm of events and a once-in-a-lifetime 
collection of surrounding circumstances threaten to disrupt the model 
 
 283. McCann, Six Skepticisms, supra note 232. 
 284. Branch, supra note 254; McCollough, supra note 14 (“Colleges reap billions from these student 
athletes’ sacrifices and success but, in the same breath, block them from earning a single dollar.” 
(quoting California Governor Gavin Newsom)). 
 285. See Alston I, F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see 
also Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1258 (9th Cir. 2020); Nocera, College Sports Charade, supra note 29 
(“[The NCAA] has developed a 400-page rule book whose primary purpose is to ensure that money 
does not find its way into players’ pockets. It claims that it is doing so to prevent players from being 
exploited—which is laughable—and to make sure that education comes first—equally laughable.”). 
 286. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070–71, 1074–75; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258. 
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even further, leaving the NCAA wounded and vulnerable.287 Rather 
than delaying the inevitable any longer, the NCAA must face reality 
and abandon its amateurism principles for the good of the athletes 
and for its own livelihood.288 
Judge Wilken’s order in Alston and the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent 
affirmance jumpstarted that process by explicitly recognizing that 
college athletes are in fact compensated in exchange for their athletic 
services.289 Translating this exact language into the FLSA context 
compels a finding that college athletes qualify as employees entitled 
to the protections of the FLSA. Though the NCAA and its member 
institutions would face administrative hurdles in complying with the 
FLSA, classifying college athletes as employees would actually 
reinforce the NCAA’s position as a necessary governing body in 
college athletics.290 Two models could be implemented to allow the 
NCAA and its member institutions to continue to function in 
compliance with the FLSA: (1) an optional educational model that 
provides a fixed-salary for athletes; or (2) a unique collective 
bargaining approach featuring sport-specific salary caps and 
university group licensing agreements. 
Mounting judicial, legislative, and societal pressure shows a loss 
of deference for the NCAA’s amateurism principles.291 The NCAA 
must face reality and proactively abandon the antiquated principles, 
recognizing college athletes as employees under the FLSA, or else 
the governing body of college athletics faces imminent extinction. 
 
 287. See, e.g., Forde, supra note 33; Gordon, supra note 18; Murphy, Congressional NIL Options, 
supra note 7 (“The [Supreme Court] made what several experts say is a surprising decision . . . to hear 
the NCAA’s appeal of [the] recent antitrust lawsuit decision [in Alston].”). 
 288. Rosenthal, supra note 226, at 16; see also Kane, supra note 227, at 209 (“Recognizing 
student-athletes as employees and compensating them as such is the most beneficial way to reform the 
NCAA and its relationship with student-athletes.”); see also Pearl, supra note 9. 
 289. Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097; see also Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248. 
 290. Johnson, supra note 240; LeRoy, supra note 253, at 1119–20. 
 291. See, e.g., Zagger, supra note 10; Gordon, supra note 18; Nocera, College Sports Charade, supra 
note 29 (“The charade has gone on far too long, as has the exploitation of college athletes.”). 
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